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Performance policies propose to enhance the quality of services provided to
vulnerable citizens. However, the ability to accomplish this goal is largely
unsubstantiated. In the field of education, the No Child Left Behind Act outlined
performance policy guidelines that held educators accountable for disadvantaged students
outcomes and provided students with the option to seek the serves of alternative
providers through a student transfer provision. This dissertation assesses the quality of
states’ NCLB provisions that targeted minority and vulnerable student performance as
well as utilization of the NCLB transfer provision allowing students to exit
underperforming schools. It indicates that teachers’ union strength, minority student
population, and past performance impacted the development of vulnerable student
accountability provisions. The use of the transfer provision was limited by the strength of
the accountability system implemented. As a result, the transfer provision is being poorly
utilized and the states have negatively affected the educational opportunities of
marginalized populations.
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INTRODUCTION

Background
Efforts to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector have
increasingly relied on the use of performance management techniques. Mechanisms such
as quantitative measures of outcomes, employee and organizational accountability
sanctions, and the public reporting of results have received considerable political support
from policymakers. Support is particularly evident in the field of education where
performance policies serve as the central component of reforms aiming to improve the
academic performance of racial minorities and economically disadvantaged students.
Most recently, President Obama’s Race to the Top Program has promoted performance
principles by allowing states to compete for billions of dollars if they agreed to reform
teacher pay and link teacher salary and tenure to student outcomes and invest in charter
school programs that provide options for disadvantaged students attending public schools
with a history of poor academic performance (Obama, 2009). This legislation serves as a
complement to the more controversial No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 which invested
millions of dollars into the development of accountability models that required states to
demonstrate significant progress in enhancing outcomes for vulnerable student groups,
link school funding and employee tenure to educational outcomes, and provide options
for students attending schools consecutively failing to meet preexisting performance
1

goals (Wong, 2008). Like other reform efforts, these policies focus on performance
measures and accountability as effective means for improving public service quality and
outcomes for the most vulnerable members of society but fail to adequately consider the
environments in which they will be implemented and its potential impacts on measure
development and use.
Light (2006) noted the importance of environmental considerations as well as the
perils of blindly subscribing to performance management’s assertions of enhanced
outcomes and posited that there needed to be “a moratorium on new reforms until an
independent body can complete a detailed examination of just how past reforms have
worked” (Light, 2006 p. 17). Such an examination is particularly important as it relates
to the impact that performance policies have on the lives of the most vulnerable members
of society which includes: racial minorities, economically disadvantaged students, and
those who spoke limited English. These individuals are largely dependent on elected
officials and administrators to create policies that promote equality, efficacy, and their
overall state of wellbeing. Poorly developed performance policies may impact them at a
greater rate than their more affluent counterparts who are less dependent on the
government to provide services that determine their life chances. Given the significance
and understudied impact that performance reform policies have on the lives of vulnerable
groups of citizens, this research responds to Light’s call for additional research by
examining the development and sanctioning provisions of the No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB) which target the performance of racial minorities, the economically
disadvantaged, and other vulnerable student subgroups. More specifically, it assesses
two questions: does the political and organizational environment influence the strength of
2

state NCLB accountability provisions targeting the performance of vulnerable student
subgroups, and have states with stronger subgroup accountability provisions more
effectively promoted or actualized the transfer provision allowing vulnerable students to
exit poorly performing schools?
Building on the works of others (Patrick and French, 2011; Carnoy and Loeb,
2002; Nichols et al., 2005), this study develops a seven point performance index that
highlights elements important to performance management reforms while capturing
pertinent policy provisions of NCLB that require states to present a student population in
which 100 percent of minority and other vulnerable subgroups are proficient in selected
subjects but also allow the state to determine what elements of student knowledge will be
assessed and how that assessment will be conducted and documented. By assessing the
subgroup provisions, this research presents a more meaningful analysis of states’
commitment to performance accountability. The assessment of subgroup accountability
provisions is important because the failure of any one subgroup to meet performance
targets can result in a failing classification for the entire school. Once a school is deemed
failing, the parents are granted the right to evoke the transfer provision and transfer their
children to higher performing school, which involves taking federal and state funds with
from the underperforming school. Given awareness of the challenges associated with
advancing the outcomes for these vulnerable groups, an assessment of legislation
outlining how these scores are tabulated and recorded may serve as one of the most
effective means of assessing NCLB performance reforms.
The elements included in the index measuring subgroup accountability strength
are: preexisting accountability models, the use of a 75 percent confidence interval in
3

reporting subgroup scores, a 10 percent rule, uniform averaging of scores, and the type of
trajectory system each state selected. By assessing state definitions of each of these
terms, we can gain a better understanding of whether the development process was
designed to lead to meaningful and challenging performance reforms or, if it simply
complied with federal mandates thereby limiting opportunities for significant
advancement under performance management. This research begins with an overview of
performance reforms including those associated with NCLB. Discussions of the
performance accountability index, outcome variables, and independent variables are
included in the research methods and variables section. Results of the analyses are
reviewed in the discussion of the variations in state performance systems section.
Problem Statement
The Classical Model of Public Administration has been characterized as being
inefficient and ineffective due to various constraints including: bureaucratic monopolies,
generic management, limited or dysfunctional compliance accountability models, lack of
emphasis on performance, and antiquated structures that cannot adequately respond to
environmental changes (Moe, 2011; Wong, 2008; Gore, 1993; Osborne and Gaebler).
Contemporary academicians, policy makers, and reform advocates point to New Public
Management (NPM) as a feasible alternative. The basic tenants of NPM include: (1) the
notion that public sector efficiency and effectiveness can be enhanced through the
development of meaningful performance measurement systems that outline goals and
emphasize targets, (2) compliance accountability models should be replaced with
performance accountability models that inspire employees to improve the quality of their
performance, (3) market type competition will provide citizens with options and enhance
4

service quality, and (4) utilizing sanctions for poor performance will increase outcomes
(King, 1987). Though these reforms propose to make meaningful changes, some scholars
have begun to question the success of the reform movement.
Kirlin (2001) posited that many proponents of the new reforms have claimed
positive results stemming from the reforms without sufficient evidence. His sentiment
was shared by Light (2006) who proposed a moratorium be placed on new performance
management reforms until the effectiveness of previous reforms have been adequately
evaluated. Agreeing with Kirlin (2001) and Light (2006), Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill
(2005) called for an organizing framework for empirical governance research that
measures the relationship between the outputs of administrators’ activities and the
assessment of the activity by the stakeholders before one prematurely analyzes the new
reforms (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill, 2000). Janet Kelly (2003) asserts that there are
consequences for making the assumption that performance constitutes accountability to
citizens for outcomes that matter to them. Furthermore, she also asserts that the new
reforms will cure the ills of public administration before proving that the new reform
movement works can be detrimental and ultimately fracture the policy makers’
relationships with the citizens as well as the service providers (Kelly, 2003).
The recent calls for evidence of success or failure for performance are not new or
isolated. Concerns over the use of performance measure systems and accountability
models in the public arena are a reoccurring issue in public administration literature.
Ridley and Simon (1943) noted that the use of performance measures could bridge the
gap between administrators and citizens because citizens would be provided with an
instrument to gauge whether they were getting efficient services or not. However, they
5

warned that poorly developed performance measure systems could have a negative effect
on outcomes and service quality (Ridley and Simon, 1943). Joyce (1993) added that the
adoption of the wrong measures could cause NPM and other performance management
reforms to function as a cure that was worse than the ills of poor performance. The lack
of clarity about performance management and measurement caused Aaron Wildaskvy to
posit that he once believed that performance measurement was a good thing but he later
questioned why public organizations should evaluate performance (Caiden, 1998). Smith
(1999) also noted the dangers of developing performance systems that are linked to
funding by posing that internal stakeholders may be motivated to increases in error,
fraud, falsification, and misrepresentation.
The lack of clarity and evidence evaluating performance reform highlight the
need for additional research on how performance reforms have been implemented and
their impact on the citizenry. This research undertakes the task by examining whether
policymakers and administrators create meaningful and challenging performance
accountability systems when developing performance systems that have funding
implications, are highly visible, and target areas of weakness/areas where organizations
have historically performed poorly. More specifically, it assesses three research
questions: (1) can leaders be expected to operate under the veil of ignorance and create
challenging performance systems? (2) What role do organizational and political variables
play in development of performance measures or accountability systems that target areas
of weakness or poor performance? (3) Lastly, does the presence of strong performance
accountability systems produce the desired outcomes of empowering citizens with
options and enhanced outcomes?
6

In order to adequately address the research questions the dissertation will examine
critical performance elements of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). NCLB
called for major reforms to public education by requiring states to shift from compliance
or bureaucratic accountability models that held educators and administrators accountable
for following the rules to performance accountability models that emphasized outcome
accountability, competition, and sanctions (Wong, 2008). The NCLB performance
movement in education has been one of the most massive expansions of NPM and
performance management in the public arena to date. Federal guidelines stipulated that
each of the fifty states develop an accountability model by responding to a series of
uniform questions that would serve as the basis of the state’s NLCB accountability
model. The uniform questions required sweeping reforms throughout the states.
However, the accountability models have raised concerns about the development and
implementation processes. Several scholars have noted that states’ responses have
resulted in very different accountability models with varying levels of strength.
For example, Patrick and French (2011) pointed out that states used varying
tactics to reward educators for high performance under NCLB. Educators in states such
as Connecticut, Illinois, and Utah received certificates for meeting or achieving
performance expectations. Conversely, educators in the states of Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, and North Carolina received additional grant funds,
monetary rewards for teachers, and additional discretion for meeting or exceeding
performance goals (Patrick and French, 2011). Patrick (2007) added that states developed
varying policies that allowed them to use confidence intervals that provided for the
manipulation of reported results for student groups.
7

Porter, Linn, and Trimble (2005) noted that the use of confidence intervals in
Kentucky resulted in the majority of all public schools meeting performance targets. If
confidence intervals had not been included in the legislation only a minute fraction of
schools that met performance expectations would have been classified as meeting them.
Similar findings were reported in the state of South Dakota where the use of confidence
intervals allowed a subgroup of ten students to meet the state’s 45 percent proficiency
goal if only one student in the group tested proficient on the standardized exam (South
Dakota Department of Education, 2005). The variations identified by these and other
scholars highlight the need for research assessing states’ development and
implementation tactics.
Although several scholars have attempted to assess accountability frameworks in
education (Sherman, 2008; Carnoy, 2005; Hanushek and Raymond, 2003; Carnoy and
Loeb, 2002; Haney, 2000; Nichols et al., 2005), they suffered numerous shortcomings
including the lack of uniform procedures throughout the states, missing data, and unclear
or questionable measurement or evaluation techniques. Many of the studies also assessed
performance accountability models in the pre-NCLB state environments. In an effort to
overcome the limitation these studies encountered, this research utilizes the evaluation
technique set forth by Patrick (2007) and Patrick and French (2011). These scholars
conducted a qualitative analysis of each state’s NLCB legislation to identify critical
performance components that aligned with central tenants of NPM. The components
were then indexed into an accountability rubric that measured the strength of each state’s
performance model. Following their frameworks, this research seeks to expand beyond
their broad focus or assessment of general accountability provisions for overall student
8

performance and conducts a more specialized assessment of NCLB accountability
provisions governing the performance of vulnerable groups of students who have
traditionally performed poorly.
These subgroups of students, which include: racial minorities, economically
disadvantaged students, and those who spoke limited English were the primary targets of
federal reforms. States were required to distinguish the results of these students from the
overall student averages and demonstrate that each group advanced toward the goal of
producing a student population that was 100 percent proficient by the end of the 2014
school term. If any one subgroup failed to meet performance targets for two consecutive
time intervals the school could be subjected to performance sanctions which included the
loss of funding, dismissal of teachers and administrators, and state intervention resulting
in the school closing, being placed under the control of a private contractor, or converted
to a charter school. Achieving targets for these students presented a greater challenge for
states than enhancing the overall outcomes for the general population.
The study’s research model includes a series of political and organizational
variables that measure elements deemed important in public administration and
organizational literature. The independent variables include: percentage of teachers with
advanced educational degrees, National Educators Association membership, past
performance, minority student population, spending per pupil, administrative capacity,
and political affiliation or voting in the presidential election. Two dependent variables are
included. The first dependent variable is an accountability index that measures the
strength of each state’s subgroup provisions.
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The second dependent variable addresses a NLCB sanctioning provision that
allows parents in poor performing schools to transfer their children to better performing
schools. This dependent variable is defined as the percentage of eligible students
participating in the school transfer program. The variable provides for an assessment of
performance reform’s ability to provide citizens with an alternative and promotes an
environment where those services are utilized in a meaningful manner. This creates an
environment where performance sanctions can potentially induce the desired outcomes.
Theoretical Framework
The principal agent relationship implies that two parties enter into a binding
agreement with each other. The principal or party in need of a service hires the agent to
perform a task on his or her behalf. The agent agrees to safeguard the interest of the
principal and complete the task in the most efficient and effective manner. If the agent
fails to uphold his contractual obligation, the principal may seek retribution in the form of
legal or financial sanctions. In the private sector, sanctions are inferred through the
principal’s ability to seek the services of an alternative provider. In the public sector, such
sanctions are limited. These limitations create an environment where the agent can
manipulate the relationship and leave the principal with few remedies.
Terry Moe (2003) highlights such an example in the public school arena. He
argues that outdated compliance accountability models have allowed self-interested,
disconnected, and unconcerned educators to linger in the education system (Moe, 2003).
Their presence decreases the quality of education students receive. However parents,
especially low income minority parents, have few remedies to the problem. Cooper’s
(2005) assessment of low income African American parents and guardians lends support
10

to Moe’s hypothesis. She found that many of the parents expressed frustration with
educators working in their neighborhood schools. They believed that some teachers did
not care about the students or the quality of their education (Cooper, 2005). Archbald
(2004) and Saporito (2003) noted that parents who were living in poverty were so
discouraged by the quality of their public schools that they desired the opportunity to
participate in a school choice program that would allow their children to attend other
schools.
The concerns raised by these parents, Moe, and others have caused policymakers
to seek out new techniques that might be used to reform the nature of the principal agent
relationship between citizens and agents in the public school arena. One such mechanism
of reform is the No Child Left Behind Act. NCLB required states to target the
performance and education of vulnerable racial minorities and economically
disadvantaged students by requiring them to develop performance targets that would
result in 100 percent of the students in these respective groups being proficient in selected
subject areas by the end of the 2014 school term. In an effort to overcome the state
inflicted roadblocks the Clinton Administration performance education legislation
encountered, federal policymakers established a set of uniform sanctions to be
implemented throughout the states for poor performance. Most notable among these
sanction was the requirement that schools failing to meet performance targets for two
consecutive time periods must provide students attending those schools with the option to
transfer to another school within the district that met performance targets. Students must
also be provided with the option to receive additional academic assistance from outside
entities not affiliated with the school. The failing schools are required to finance the cost
11

of the additional assistance. Teachers could also be released for poor student academic
performance.
Though the federal guidelines have subscribed to the principles of NPM it is
important to assess how states have implemented these federal reforms. Qualitative
studies have raised questions about state sanction implementation. For example, Brown
(2004) pointed out that administrators and policymakers included in their 5 state study
may not be committed to sanction implementation. In the State of Mississippi, a state
with a history of poor performance and sizable populations of disadvantaged students,
less than three percent of transfer eligible students actually transferred out of
underperforming schools. Kahlenberg (2010) noted that approximately $1.8 billion had
been set aside for student transfers and supplemental services but it is unclear if students
in states with the most needs are gaining access to the market techniques that provide
them with options for alternative services. This study’s assessment of states’
accountability provision development, implementation, and impact on outcome will offer
insight on this issue. The research will also offer meaningful insight on the state of
performance management reforms in the public arena.
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one provides the
foundation and theoretical framework for the dissertation. Chapter two reviews the
accountability and performance management reforms in public administration literature,
reviews education reforms, and provides a framework to assess the No Child Left Behind
Act. Chapter three outlines the research design. Chapter four presents the findings.
Chapter five concludes the dissertation, discusses implications of the study, and offer
future research suggestions.
12

EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Introduction
In order to understand the expansion of teacher and administrator performance
accountability models in education it is essential to provide a historical overview of
accountability models in the public arena as it relates to education. This chapter pursues
this goal by highlighting major eras and pertinent scholars in education and
accountability research. It begins with a discussion of accountability models under the
Classical School of Thought of Public Administration literature. It then proceeds with a
discussion of Behavioralist Era of research and thinking. Finally, it concludes with a
review of New Public Administration, efforts to reinvent government, and the expansion
of New Public Management and performance management.
Accountability under the Classical Model of Public Administration
The Classical Model of public administration highlights the importance of
control, stability, uniformity, the efficient use of resources, employee accountability to
superiors, and compliance with the rules and procedures. Noted among scholars
contributing to this school of thought are Weber, Udy, Taylor, Gulick, and Brownlow.
Weber (1954) proposed that the “ideal” public agency or organization should include a
division of labor, a hierarchy of authority, extensive rules to which employees are held
13

accountable for following, specialization of task, and hiring and promotion based on
technical competency. He further envisioned an organizational framework where trained
employees who abided by organizational rules and procedures would enjoy job tenure for
life. They would be safeguarded from fears of political retribution and free to focus on
effectively committing to organizational functions and goals (Weber, 1954).
Udy (1959) expanded on Weber’s work by positing that public organizations
could be systematically measured to demonstrate the degree to which organizations are or
are not bureaucratic. In order to empirically measure the characteristics of an
organization, a scientist must find a way to remove the human element from the
organizations. Under this notion, the idea of building public organizations that were
efficient machines devoid of human characteristics flourished. Frederick Taylor, who is
regarded as the ‘father of scientific management,’ is widely cited for his work on
time/motion studies that largely focused on the machine aspects of public organizations.
Scientific management purported that studying what workers did and finding the
one best way to complete the task would enhance efficiency (Nigro and Nigro, 1994).
Workers who met expectations would be retained, rewarded, and promoted. Those who
did not would be retrained, demoted, or dismissed. The elements of the job which
employees were held accountable for achieving were often developed by experts who
were far removed from the task of day to day operations. This was done to limit bias in
measure development. Advocates argued, “…if the tools and procedures were accurate
then the functional goals of organizations using test or performance appraisal would be
met” (Milkovich and Wigdor, 1991 p. 45). Taylor was accused of devaluing worth of the
agents/practitioners by simply looking at them as ‘cogs in a machine’ which led to
14

criticism from subsequent scholars in the ‘behavior movement paradigm’ (Kanigel,
2005).
Luther Gulick and Henri Fayol also contributed to the Classical Model. These
scholars placed an important emphasis on bureaucratic accountability, stability, and
uniformity. They advocated an organizational framework in which employees answered
to one superior. Each scholar also denoted the importance of established rules and
regulations that set guidelines for employee behavior and performance. They believed in
the notion that there was a place for every employee and each employee had to be in his
or her place. Such strict methods of control provided for uniformity and effectiveness but
it limited employee input and discretion (Fayol, 2001; Gulick, 2002).
Likewise, the Brownlow Commission consisting of: Louis Brownlow, Charles
Mewiam, and Luther Gulick shared similar ideas. They introduced the idea of
POSDCoRB (Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and
Budgeting). POSDCoRB promoted ideas such as a hierarchy of authority, employee
actions being coordinated and directed by a superior, and lower level employees
reporting to and receiving direction from those higher in the chain of command (Gulick,
2002).
Weber (1954), Taylor (1914), Gulick (2002), and others focused on the
importance of the system of organization in which an individual worked. The main idea
was to create an environment in which superiors held employees accountable for
following the rules and direct orders of their superiors. Several scholars have identified
problems with this approach to employee accountability and organizational effectiveness.
Merton (1957) proposed that rule-based accountability dehumanized organizations by
15

creating an environment where employees function as robots that were driven by the
rules and not service quality or human needs.
Simon (1982) and Kettl (1990) noted that the classical model’s adherence to rule
based accountability ignored the human aspect of employment and severely limited
employees abilities to be creative and autonomous. This created work environments that
were of poor quality due to employee stress. These propositions have been validated by
numerous studies in the field of education.
The Classical Era of Public Administration and Education Policy
Similar to the public sector workforce, education scholars have found lack of
productivity and apathy amongst educators when stripped of their autonomy.
McConnell’s (1971) work on professionals in the university setting revealed that faculty
members became highly stressed, de-motivated, and resentful when the university
administration tightened control over their actions. Platt and Parson (1973) added that
administrator/faculty relationships can become contentious under stringent rule based
accountability models that limit input and discretion. Similarly, Rosenholtz (1987) added
that a lack of discretion and input increased teacher absenteeism and frustration.
Chubb and Moe (1990) suggest that increased bureaucratic accountability
negatively affected educators and decreased student performance. Meier et al (2000)
added that accountability elements of the bureaucratic structure can decrease student
performance and increase teacher turnover. A study linking educators’ decisions to exit
the profession to principles promoted by Weber found the principles help to create an
environment where the profession became a rotating door; teachers would flow in and
out. The study linked teachers’ decisions to exit to a lack of support and input. Schools
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in which teachers had more input and control experienced approximately an 18 percent
decrease in the number of teachers who exited the school (Ingersoll, 2001).
Accountability and the Behavior Era
The human element of organizations was downplayed in the classical model of
public administration. Scholars such as Elton Mayo, Abraham Maslow, and Douglas
McGregor noted that there were various factors that motivated humans to make certain
decisions. The single most significant set of events that preceded and presaged a
conscious theory (and field) of organizational behavior was the multiyear work done
by the Elton Mayo team at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company
beginning in 1927 (Mayo, 1933; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939). Their work
sparked the examination of the organizational behavior perspective or modern
theories of motivating. “The Hawthorn experiments showed that complex,
interactional variables make the difference in motivation people- things like attention
paid to workers as individuals, workers’ control over their work, differences between
individuals’ needs, the willingness of managers to listen, group norms, and direct
feedback” (Ott, et. al., 2008 pg. 132-3). The experiments revitalized the American
workforce and fostered modern public-sector employee innovations.
Although his theories have been heavily criticized for being overly simple
(Wahba and Bridwell, 1973), Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory serves as a
seminal text in the study of organization behavior. Maslow argued: “[A]ll humans have
basic needs that underlie their motivational structure, once the lower level of needs are
satisfied they no longer serve ‘drive’ behavior because satisfied needs are not motivators,
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finally, once lower-level needs of workers become satisfied, higher-order needs take
precedence as motivating factors” (Ott, Parks, Simpson, 2008 pg. 133).
McGregor introduced the Theory X and Y to explain the humanistic element of
organizational behavior. In, ‘The Humanistic Side of Enterprise,’ McGregor labeled two
alternative sets of assumptions regarding employee motivation, Theory X and Theory Y.
McGregor’s Theory X assumption is aligned with the Classical Model of Public
Administration; it contends that humans are inherently lazy, dislike work, and will
attempt to avoid it whenever possible. Therefore, people must be motivated through:
coercion, force, or threat of sanctions to work towards the goals of the organization. In
contrast, McGregor’s Theory Y assumes that people do not inherently dislike work. It
contends that employees will exercise self-control if they are committed to the objectives
of the organization. Theory Y focuses on the lack of autonomy given to individuals and
contends that workers are unmotivated oftentimes because they are not allowed to utilize
their intellectual potential (McGregor, 1960).
Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn (1978) noted that the early pioneers of PA failed to
adequately deal with the transaction between the organization and the environment in
which it functioned. Chester Barnard (1968) and his followers stressed the role of the
individual within the organization and contended that it is the individual that is
responsible for carrying out the orders and making the decisions within the organization.
Therefore, it is important to recognize the importance of the individuals within the
organization and incorporate the workers in the in the building of effective accountability
models in order to achieve optimal results.
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One approach to promoting accountability under the behavioralist model is an
emphasis on professional accountability. Under professional accountability models
employees are granted more input and control over the work environment. They are
largely held accountable by professional standards and less stringent compliance
accountability techniques.
Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, and Damon (2001) noted that increased autonomy and
control over the work environment frees employees to be more efficient and effective
because they are cognizant of the fact that the outcome will represent them and their
abilities. They also understand that poor work quality and dismal outcome can lead to
professional reprimands by their colleagues and legal actions by citizens (Leonard et al,
2003; Rousseau, 1995). Horner (2001) also pointed out that such accountability models
can promote efficiency because employees are free to make decisions. They don’t have to
wait for decisions to slowly flow down the chain of command. This promotes a more
productive workforce.
Terry (1998) argues that professional accountability is necessary and warranted
because the public sector workforce is composed of trained professional who are skilled
at their craft. He noted that long gone are the days of unskilled clerks who required
pointed direction and control. Today’s managers and employees are highly skilled and
committed to their craft. The desire to hold them accountable to stringent rules and
bureaucratic accountability will result in waste. He further eludes that poor service
quality is not the result of managerial incompetence or malfeasance. It is the result of a
bad system that overburdens managers and employees with rules, regulations, and red
tape.
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Other advocates of Peter’s (2002) deregulatory model argue that professional
accountability would limit many of the current mechanisms that hinder efficiency. Rules
increasing red tape could be removed and give managers more control over the day to
day operations. They would have more authority to effectively direct, hire, and fire
employees. This would allow them to more efficiently and effectively pursue
organizational goals.
Lorsch and Morse further elaborated on the role of the individuals within an
organization and the use of varying accountability models by noting that an employee’s
reaction towards his or her work is a result of his or her personal expectations and the
characteristics of the organization in which he or she are employed (Lorsch and Mores,
1974).
The Behavior Era and Education Policy
The Behaviorist model countered the classical model’s ideology regarding
individuals within the organizations as cogs in the machine and illustrated the importance
of the individuals within the organization. It gave the teachers and administrators more
autonomy. Similar to the individuals in McGregor’s Theory Y, Terry Moe noted that we
made the assumption that all teachers were motivated to work. Unfortunately, we have
learned that many of the teachers are more like Theory X and this has disproportionately
affected low income and minority students.
The Era of New Public Administration
Though behaviorists sought enhanced efficiency and effectiveness by
emphasizing the human element of public organizations, limited success, concerns for
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equity and fairness, and citizens’ concerns for cost and service quality led to a call for
additional reforms.
Frederickson wrote:
Conventional and classic public administration seeks to answer either of these
questions: (1) How can we offer more or better services with available resources
(efficiency)? Or (2) How can service levels be maintained while spending less
money (Economy)? A new public administration adds this question: Does this
service enhance social equity? To say that a service may be well managed and
that a service may be efficient and economical, stills beg these questions: Well
managed for whom? Efficient for whom? Economical for whom? Traditionally
public administration assumed a convenient oneness to the public (Frederickson,
1980)
There were growing concerns that there was too much reliance on the expertise of the
bureaucrats and the capability of the bureaucracies and not enough scrutiny was aimed
towards the agencies. Therefore, scholars, theorists, and researchers addressed the
concerns of the dissatisfied citizens by developing New Public Administration (NPA).
Frederickson noted that bureaucratic agencies had very little concern for the
citizens and a general resistance towards equity (Frederickson, 1996). In NPA, there is
an underlying assumption that there is a commitment to public service by a wellinformed citizenry. It attempted to revitalize the citizenry trust in government by
implementing rules and regulations that will forbid governmental agencies from
discriminating against previously discriminated groups. Kingsley (1944) argued that the
public sector employers should streamline their objectives and focus more on
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representative bureaucracy. He felt that if diversity was properly implemented in
governmental bureaucracies then the agencies would be seen as more responsive and
could better serve the interests of the public.
As a result, NPA adopted the spirit of the major Supreme Court decisions,
legislation, and Presidential Executive orders including: (1) 1954 Brown v. Board
decision, which overturned the 1896 Plessey v. Ferguson decision and called for
desegregation. (2) The Brown v. Board 2 further advanced the previous decision and
called for desegregation ‘with all deliberate speed.’ (3) The Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which prohibited discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. (4)
The 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which made it illegal for companies to
discriminate against employees between the ages of 40 and 65. (5) The Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which protected citizens with disabilities from discrimination
in federal employment. (6) The American Disabilities Act of 1990 extended the
Vocational Rehabilitation to include all organizations with fifteen or more workers. (7)
The Executive Order 11246, which called for ‘affirmative action’. (8) The Alexander v.
Holmes 1968 decision, which called for desegregation ‘At Once.’
New Public Administration shifted the focus of public administration from
focusing on economy, efficiency, and effectiveness to a focus on equity. Dwight Waldo
criticized the previous scholars’ beliefs and usages of the terms efficiency and economy
in his book, The Administrative State. He sarcastically asked, “What is the meaning of
efficiency?” His response was, “[T]here are but two fundamental meanings. One of these
meanings might be called the philosophical. It is the notion of energy, force, or cause”
(Waldo, 1948. pg. 201).
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As a result, policies and procedures were introduced to ensure that disadvantaged
groups were no longer being discriminated against on a large scale. The views of the
employees as espoused by the behaviorist scholars were expounded to include the diverse
demographic characteristics of the employees. Unfortunately, many of the court
decisions, executive orders, and legislative acts were ignored or shirked by
unsympathetic authorities. Therefore, NPA was an attempt to account for almost every
federal employment human resource concern and the OPM rules and regulations were
becoming overly cumbersome for the employees.
New Public Administration and Education Policy
Under NPA, we have a federalist attempt to address the shortcomings of the
behaviorist movement. As noted earlier, the major tenant of the Era of New Public
Administration was a focus on Equity. Throughout the 1960’s and 70’s, there was strong
public demand for uniform accountability standards on the part of the students as well as
the teachers (West and Peterson, 2003). Two major education components were the 1965
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the 1969 National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP). These initiatives were introduced to combat the failed
educational policies that: 1) did not hold the students accountable for learning, and 2) did
not hold the teachers accountable for teaching.
The 1960’s ‘War on Poverty’ looked at several ways to assist underprivileged
individuals in their plight for social, economic, and political upward mobility. President
Lyndon B. Johnson believed that education could be used as a viable mechanism to
combat poverty in America and made equity a major focus of the 1965 Elementary and
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Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Julie Jeffery noted that poverty planners felt that
achievement in school was directly related to economic status (Jeffery, 1978).
Jeffery (1978) further inserted that the ESEA never could have lived up to
potential hopes primarily because policy makers failed to confront the basic fundamental
ills within the American public school system. Massey and Denton posited that the
primary reason racial disparities existed after desegregation is due to the white-flight
phenomenon as Blacks moved in to the inner cities (Massey and Denton, 1993). Orfield
and Lee noted that school segregation reemerged between 1991 and 2001 (Orfield and
Lee, 2004).
There have been several studies that have dealt with the disparities in educational
opportunities between minorities and their white counterparts (Jencks and Phillips, 1998).
Hedges and Nowell used data from six national surveys conducted between 1965 – 1992
and found that test scores disparities between Blacks and Whites actually declined over
this time period (Hedges and Nowell, 1998). Fryer and Levitt found that adjusting for
background characteristics of students reduced the achievement gap of Black and White
kindergarteners but had no affect after kindergarten (Fryer and Levitt, 2004).
The Era of New Public Management
During the 1980s and 90s reform efforts primarily promoted the notion that
government should be reinvented in a manner that resulted in it being more efficient and
effective by cutting red tape and adopting market reforms. The two most visible
proponents of the movement were journalist, David Osborn, and former city manager,
Ted Gaebler. Reinventing Government served as the preeminent text for the reinvention
movement from the late 1980’s through the 2000’s. It called for the removal of the
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procedural ‘red tape’ that burdened the bureaucratic workforce. It also asserted that the
way to obtain effectiveness and efficiency was to introduce performance measures that
focused on the desired outcomes of the agency. The authors wanted to empower the
lower level workers through a decentralization process (Osborn and Gaebler, 1992).
Osborn and Gaebler also included the idea of incorporating the private sector
market-based mechanism that fosters competition into public administration. The most
visible new strategy adopted during the Reinventing Government Era is the adoption of
private-sector market-driven practices. Some of the more controversial practices adopted
by the NPM movement include the incorporation of incentive based initiatives and
privatizing social services.
In alignment with the ‘reinvention’ tone set by Osborn and Gaebler, two separate
commissions were created to find successful ways to incorporate the reforms endorsed by
Osborn and Gaebler into the public sector. The ‘Winter Commission’ was established to
address the needs of state and local human resource practices, and the ‘National
Performance Review’ headed by Vice President Albert Gore was responsible for
addressing the problems of the federal government human resource dilemmas. These two
initiatives provided the fundamental theoretical tenets of the ‘reinvention paradigm.’
The Winter Commission recommended removing the antiquated civil service
human resource system and replacing it with a more common sense approach in an
attempt to address effectiveness and efficiency in the public sector. The commission
ridiculed the system saying, “The Commission believes that states and localities are best
served by a decentralized merit system that helps agencies and departments address
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issues of hiring and mobility, pay, diversity, firing, and the operation of the personnel
system” (Winter Commission, 1993).
The Winter Commission was very clear in regards to its commitment towards
diversity. It noted, “The pattern and the problem are clear. The face of America outside
government is changing faster than the face of the work force inside...The disconnection
between those whom government serves and those who serve government can only create
tension” (Dilulio, 1994 p. 293).
In regards to hierarchy and the rules that govern bureaucratic organizations, the
Winter Commission recommended flattening the bureaucratic hierarchical structure. It
noted, “Flattening the bureaucracy by reducing the number of management layers
between the top and bottom of agencies and thinning the ranks of the managers who
remain” (Winter Commission, 1993 p. 11). The Winter Commission (1993) felt that
bureaucratic organizations could achieve efficiency with less management overhead to
supervise the street-level employees.
In 1993, President Clinton instructed Vice President Gore to head a commission
that would offer recommendations for a more effective federal government. He noted,
“Our goal is to make the entire federal government both less expensive and more efficient
and to change the culture of our national bureaucracy away from complacency and
entitlement toward initiative and empowerment. We intend to redesign, to reinvent, to
reinvigorate the entire national government” (Gore, 1993 p. 1). Osborn and Gaebler
were added on to the taskforce and they were very influential in the creation of the
National Performance Review (1993). They incorporated several of their ideas listed in
their bestselling book, Reinventing Government. The NPR report strategically introduced
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several private sector human resource practices into the federal workforce. According to
the NPR, if the federal government would adopt the recommendations of the NPR, “the
government can work better and cost less” (Gore, 1993). The NPR was intended to steer
the government from ‘Red tape to reinvention.’ This report pushed responsiveness to the
people by: incorporating testable mechanisms in the bureaucracies, restructuring the
hierarchical chart, rewriting the job descriptions, and firing a considerable amount of the
middle managers (Gore, 1993)
The NPR team held several meeting with federal employees including top-level
employees, middle managers, and lower ranking employees. They concluded that the
federal government was in need of a massive overhaul. The committee noted, “To create
an effective federal government, we must reform virtually the entire personnel system:
recruitment, hiring, classification, promotion, pay, and reward systems. We must make it
easier for federal managers to hire the workers they need, to reward those who do good
work, and to fire those who do not” (National Performance Review, 2003). The National
Academy of Public Administration echoed their sentiments; they noted, “It is not a
question of whether the federal government should change how it manages its human
resources. It must change” (Gore, 1993 p. 22).
The NPR committee also studied the practices of several agencies that
experimented with progressive human resource policies including the Naval Weapons
Center in China Lake, CA. and the Naval Oceans Systems Center in San Diego, CA. The
progressive practices included: paying market salaries which allowed them to recruit the
best and brightest employees, increasing pay for outstanding employees, removing
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marginal and/or poor performing employees, and promoting based on performance as
opposed to seniority (Winter Commission, 1993).
Following the meetings with federal employees and the studies of successful
progressive human resource strategies, the NPR committee introduced the following
recommendations: replacing the federal personnel manual, simplifying the hiring and
firing process, designing agency specific performance management reward systems, and
enhancing the quality of work-life (Winter Commission, 1993).
In regards to replacing the federal personnel manual, the committee noted, “OPM
will deregulate personnel policy by phasing out the 10,000 page Federal Personnel
Manual and all agency implementing directives” (National Performance Review, 2003).
They intended to empower managers by removing the ‘cumbersome red tape’ and
allowing them to work with the OPM to establish directives that are tailored to the
specific organizations (Winter Commission, 1993).
The federal human resource system was introduced to provide equitable hiring
practices and to recruit the best and brightest candidates. Over time, the federal human
resource department [OPM] became more of a hindrance than a solution mechanism. The
NPR committee found that the hiring process was a huge impediment to federal
employment personnel. Therefore, it recommended, “Give all departments and agencies
authority to conduct their own recruiting and examining for all positions, and abolish all
central registers and standard application forms” (National Performance Review, 2003).
The NPR committee was aware of the historical events that brought about many of the
hiring and firing rules, and it wanted to remain committed to equality and fairness
(Winter Commission, 1993).
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The NPR committee recognized the complexity of various federal organizations
and understood that one-size-fits-all policies to govern the entire federal workforce were
not effective. The committee’s recommendation stated, “Agencies should be allowed to
design their own performance management and reward systems, with the objectives of
improving the performance of individuals and organizations” (National Performance
Review, 2003). It went on to say, “Agencies should be allowed to develop programs that
meet the needs and reflect their cultures, including incentive programs, gain sharing
programs, and awards that link pay and performance” (National Performance Review,
2003).
The NPR committee recognized that firing an unproductive federal employee was
difficult; therefore, they wanted to significantly reduce the time it takes to get rid of an
unproductive federal employee (Winter Commission, 1993). The committee stated,
“Reduce by half the time required to terminate federal managers and employees for cause
and improve the system for dealing with poor performers” (National Performance
Review, 2003). The committee felt that this issue was very important and should be
addressed with specific and direct action (Winter Commission, 1993).
The NPR committee also suggested enhancing the quality of work life for the
federal employees by offering training workshops and financial incentives to further their
education (Winter Commission, 1993). The committee noted, “After two decades of
organizing for quality, business knows one thing for sure: Empowered people need new
skills- to work as teams, use new computer software, interpret financial and statistical
information, cooperate with and manage other people, and adapt” (Gore, 1993). The
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committee suggested borrowing these private sector practices and incorporating them in
the federal government personnel management.
Finally, the NPR committee was very concerned with empowering the federal
employees with the necessary tools to produce quality results. It recommended
decentralizing the decision making powers and allow the employees that are closer to the
problems to address the situation accordingly (Gore, 1993). An OPM innovation and
simplification survey found that fewer than half of the employees surveyed noted that
they have any confidence in supervisors’ two layers above them (Gore, 1993). This
prompted the NPR committee to suggest removing several of the mid-level managers.
New Public Management and Education Policies
The most visible impact of new public management policies affecting the public
sector can be seen in education policies. Before the 1983 ‘A Nation at Risk’ report
enacting massive educational reforms seemed impossible unless the United States
Supreme Court intervened. This report noted that the United States educational system
was dismal and ineffective. The United States high school dropout rate was abnormally
high; the current education system was not producing qualified students for the complex
job market, etc. The report alarmed Americans and warned that unless some drastic
changes were made in a hurry, then the United States was on the verge of losing its
international competiveness (Rudalevige, 2003).
The ‘Nation at Risk’ report caught the United States off guard; before the findings
were published the nation failed to pay close attention to the educational system and as a
result, it was slowly declining. This report prompted business leaders to push for more
rigorous standards for the educational system. Also, several states began to change their
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focus in regards to educational standards. Some states began to focus more on
educational outputs such as standardized scores and graduation rates as well as inputs
such as per pupil spending (Hurst et. al, 2003).
Some proponents of new public management in the educational environment
including Terry Moe (2003) have argued that a lack of accountability in the public
educational system has led to an increase in the wrong type of employees. Moe later
contended that these employees are unmotivated, aware of their job security, and are
merely interested with maintaining the status quo (Moe, 2003). Reports such as the
‘1983 Nation at Risk’ in conjunction with mounting public support enticed politicians to
enact wide spread new public management policies into the educational system.
The ‘Era of New Public Management’ introduced a number of performance
measurement policies during the 1990’s. Although the public sector differs from the
private sector in terms of desired goals, in the 1990’s the United States Federal
Government began looking at ways to better assess performance in a number of its
bureaucracies. In 1991, President George H. W. Bush introduced ‘America 2000’ which
was his proposal for national educational testing. President Bill Clinton reiterated this
initiative in 1994. President Clinton introduced the ‘Improving America’s School Act’
and ‘Goals 2000 America Act.’ These acts attempted to implement mandatory testing at
the state level. They required that all states have testing standards in place by the
beginning of the 1997-98 academic year. They also mandated that the states have clear
definitions and assessments of adequate yearly progress by 2000 – 01 academic year
(Rudalevige, 2003).
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Clinton’s ‘Goals 2000 Act’ supported the ‘Improving America’s School Act’ by
supporting comprehensive school reform efforts including the development of the content
standards (Hurst et. al., 2003). These acts, introduced by Presidents H. W. Bush and Bill
Clinton, were the first time the federal government attempted to implement across-theboard educational performance measures. The Clinton administration believed that these
measures would help ensure accountability in the educational system by providing an
avenue to assess student performance (Rudalevige, 2003).
Unfortunately, these plans did not succeed; their failures were mainly due to the
broadly written provisions and uncooperative professionals in the Department of
Education (West and Peterson, 2003). The discrepancy of the Title 1 program is a good
example of the failure of the Clinton’s plan. The portion of the plan that dealt with Title
1 funding explicitly made it known that if states failed to develop standards by the 1997
deadline the Department of Education were supposed to withhold their Title 1 funds. A
considerable number of states failed to meet the mandated deadline, but the Department
of Education rarely withheld their Title 1 funding (Rudalevige, 2003).
For several reasons, including resistance to change and lack of clarity, there were
a number of shortcomings in President Clinton’s educational policies. The act required
states to set up measures of adequately yearly progress, but it failed to set proficiency
guidelines. Also, it intended to set up the National Education Standard and Improvement
Council. This council was charged with the responsibility of defining national standards
in several educational areas. Unfortunately, the national standards were rarely drafted
because the council was rarely formed (Rudalevige, 2003).
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Unfortunately, these plans did not succeed; their failures were mainly due to the
broadly written provisions and uncooperative professionals in the Department of
Education (West and Peterson, 2003). The discrepancy of the Title 1 program is a good
example of the failure of the Clinton plan. The portion of the plan that dealt with Title 1
funding explicitly made it known that if states failed to develop standards by the 1997
deadline the Department of Education were supposed to withhold their Title 1 funds. A
considerable number of states failed to meet the mandated deadline, but the Department
of Education rarely withheld their Title 1 funding (Rudalevige, 2003).
Due to the inadequacies of NPA to address the ills of the public education system,
there was a significant push to incorporate New Public Management policies in federal
education policies (Patrick and French, 2011). The quest for assessments under the 1990
era of ‘New Public Management’ introduced a number of performance measurement
policies. According to some scholars, many of these policies were ill-conceived and
proved to be ineffective (Hurst, 2003).
New Public Management and No Child Left Behind
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) was intended to be the cure-all
for educational disparities throughout the country. Its proponents intended for it to raise
the educational standards of every child throughout the country by assuring that every
child in America is proficient in mathematics and reading by 2014. The most important
goal of the legislation was to raise the educational levels of minorities and marginalized
populations in order to close the achievement gap throughout the United States. The key
strategies for accomplishing this goal included: requiring high-stakes standardized
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testing, mandating better qualified teachers, and offering parents educational options for
underperforming schools.
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) reauthorizes the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 and is the most far-reaching federal intervention in the
education system in the history of the United States of America (Elmore, 2003). Its
Republican endorsement is noteworthy due to the fact that it contradicts the conservative
notion of Republican Party pertaining to the limiting of big government; NCLB expands
the role of the federal government drastically greater than the 1994 Improving America’s
School Act (GOALS 2000) endorsed by President Bill Clinton (DeBray, 2006). Less than
20% of the Republicans in the House of Representatives endorsed the Clinton education
plan; specifically, GOALS 2000 passed by a 305 – 121 vote and received 59 Republican
and 246 Democrat votes in the House of Representatives and with 63 Dem. Votes – 22
Rep. Votes in the U.S. Senate.
Elizabeth DeBray noted, “Bush’s particular style of leadership, enhanced by the
national mood following September 11, made it possible for his party to give
overwhelming support to an education bill that was far more pervasive and coercive than
the one it had opposed in 1994” (Debray, 2006 p. 126). 85% of the House Republicans
and 90% of the Republican Senators voted for the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act
(Wong, 2008). Lois Harrison-Jones wrote, “To his credit, President George W. Bush was
overwhelmingly successful in amassing an impressive level of bipartisan support for the
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001…This ambitious law included a potent blend of high
expectations, new requirements, incentives, sanctions, resources and accountability for
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states, districts, and schools to move faster and further to improve the academic
achievement of every child” (Harrison-Jones, 2007 pg, ).
H.R. 1 states that: “The No Child Left Behind Act will result in the creation of
assessments in each state that measure what children know and learn in reading and math
in grades 3-8” (Bush, 2001).” The bill requires that each state must report the results by
subgroups including: poverty, race, ethnicity, disability and limited English proficiency.
The states are required to show improvement in the achievement in each of the abovementioned subgroups annually (Bush, 2001).
High-stakes standardized testing is intended to objectively measure the
achievement of the students and to give voters immediate results regarding students’
progress (Elmore, 2003). Each state’s plan must demonstrate that the state has developed
and is implementing a statewide accountability system that ensures that all public schools
make adequate yearly progress (AYP). In order to comply with the AYP standards,
states’ must implement plans that: hold all public schools within the state to the same
standards, measures the progress of all schools in a statistically valid and reliable manner,
and include separate measurable annual objectives for economically disadvantaged
students, students from major racial and ethnic groups, students with disabilities, and
students with limited English proficiency.
Each state must establish statewide measurable objectives for mathematics and
reading. The measuring objective must be uniform throughout the state and at least 95%
of the students in the specified subgroups must take the statewide exams. It shall then
identify a single minimum percentage of students who are required to meet or exceed the
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proficient levels on the academic assessments that apply to each of the subgroup
categories previously mentioned.
Once the states submit the plans to the DoE, the plans are reviewed and the DoE
either approves the plans, reject the plans, or recommend changes. As a result, each state
has different testing and proficiency guidelines. States are given the option of selecting
the minimum number of students from a particular subgroup that must be present in a
school before that particular school is required to report the disaggregated scores of that
group towards their AYP (Porter, Linn, and Scott, 2005). Historically, minorities have
not performed well on standardized test and their low scores weigh heavily on the overall
scores amongst states with high percentages of minorities. Therefore, selecting a
minimum number of minority and disadvantaged students is critical to the success or
failure of a school. For example, in California, students who speak limited English are
not tested in the first three years prior to their entrance in the school system (Jacob,
2003.)
Other states such as Texas are more stringent in their designs. They have set
single performance expectations for all of their students. Therefore, in order for a school
to be considered exemplary in Texas they must receive a 90% proficiency rating for the
overall school as well as the subgroups. There are no exceptions to the rule no matter the
demographic changes in population of the children within the district. They are cut-anddry; either 90% of the children in the school are proficient or not (Patrick, 2007). Kane
and Staiger noted that states with these types of policies are faced with a difficult
dilemma; they must choose to either have easier policies or risk a high failure rate
amongst their schools (Kane and Staiger, 2002).
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According to the NCLB Act, once the scores for the individual states are
determined, the students are required to take the examinations and the states are required
to publish the results of the examinations and to give the parents and citizens access to
the proficiency percentages (Bush, 2001).
Under the NCLB Act, (2002) the federal government allows each state to set its
own specific challenging academic standards with minimal initial interference from the
U.S. Department of Education (DoE). The challenging academic standards must include
both academic content standards and academic achievement standards. The academic
content standards must: specify what the children are expected to know and be able to do,
contain coherent and rigorous content, and encourage the teaching of advanced skills.
The academic achievement standards must: align with the state’s academic content
standards, and set three levels of achievement including basic, proficient, and advanced
achievement (Bush, 2001).
Schools in states that failed to show improvement in any student subgroup could
be subjected to a series of sanctions outlined in a five-year program (See Appendix 1).
Once a school failed to meet its expected performance goals after the first year the school
is placed on a “watch” list. They are also required to develop a school improvement plan
that should help them meet their goals for the next academic year.
Under NCLB (Bush, 2001), if the school goes two consecutive years without
meeting its performance goals the school is listed as a “needs improvement” school. The
school district must provide any student attending the “needs improvement” school the
option of attending another school that has met adequate yearly progress. The district also
pays the child’s transportation costs (Bush, 2001).
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After three consecutive years of failing to meet the expected performance goals,
the NCLB Act (Bush, 2001) mandates that the district must provide any student attending
the “needs improvement” school the option of attending another school that has met
adequate yearly progress. The district pays the child’s transportation costs. Also, the
school district must offer “supplemental educational services” to any student who
qualifies for free or reduced lunch. One option for supplemental services must be from an
outside provider (Bush, 2001).
The schools who fail to meet their expected performance goals for a fourth
consecutive year are given even harsher penalties according to the NCLB Act (Bush,
2001). The school is listed as a “needs improvement” school and the district must provide
any student attending the “needs improvement” school the option of attending another
school that has met adequate yearly progress. The district also pays the child’s
transportation costs. The school district must offer “supplemental educational services” to
any student who qualifies for free or reduced lunch. One option for supplemental services
must be from an outside provider. And finally, the school must change its staffing or
make a “fundamental change” such as restructuring the school (Bush, 2001).
If a school fails to meet their expected goals for a fifth consecutive year the
school is listed as a ‘needs improvement” school just as before. In addition, the NCLB
Act (Bush, 2001) mandates that the district to provide any student attending the “needs
improvement” school the option of attending another school that has met adequate yearly
progress. The district pays transportation costs. The school district must offer
“supplemental educational services” to any student who qualifies for free or reduced
lunch. One option for supplemental services must be from an outside provider. Finally,
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the school must convert into a charter school, turn management over to a private
management company or be taken over by the state.
Notable amongst the sanctions are those found in year two. The second
consecutive year a school failed to meet performance goals, the district was required to
provide any student attending that school the option to attend another school that met
performance expectations. The option to transfer was accompanied by a provision which
inflicted a financial sanction on the underperforming school by requiring the district to
pay the cost of transportation (Brown, 2004).
The uniform sanctions were unprecedented because they could be applied if any
subgroup of students consistently failed to meet performance targets. As a compromise
and an effort to gain support, states were granted considerable discretion in how they
chose to record and report subgroup scores. The impact of the discretion is exhibited in
the way that states defined the terms of students’ adequate yearly progress, established
performance goals, and specified the terms of safe harbor provisions that would offer
assistance in the achievement of performance goals for targeted subgroups (Bush, 2001).
No Child Left Behind Accountability Provisions
One variation among states is the performance enhancement time line, specifying
how they would meet 100 percent proficiency by 2014. They could set an incremental or
back loaded trajectory system. Incremental models required equal incremental increases
in performance throughout the duration of the NCLB program. A state with a starting
point of 50% proficient in 2002 would have to increase the annual measurable objectivity
by 4% each year in order to reach the 100 percent goal by 2014. Back load trajectories
reduced the amount of pressure states encountered early in the process by allowing for
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larger increases in performance in the years closer to the 2014 deadline (Porter, Linn, and
Scott, 2005).
A second variation is found in the decision to utilize safe harbor confidence
intervals in the reporting of students’ test scores. Confidence intervals allow a school to
avoid a failing classification if a subgroup misses the performance target but falls within
a particular range of the goal. For example, in 2004 South Dakota schools with 20
students in a particular subgroup were viewed as meeting the state’s 45 percent
proficiency goal if four students in the group passed (South Dakota Department of
Education, 2005). Porter Linn, and Trimble (2005) noted that Kentucky used confidence
intervals in a similar manner. They pointed out that without the use of confidence
intervals in conjunction with other techniques 73 percent of schools serving majority
disadvantaged student populations would have failed to meet the expected performance
expectations.
The decision to utilize the safe harbor 10 percent rule also allows for data
manipulation. The rule stipulates that a subgroup may fail to meet the state performance
targets for the year but the school can avoid a failing classification if the percentage of
students in the subgroup who tested proficient is 10 percent higher than the previous year.
For example, a state may set a goal of 70 percent of the students in a particular subgroup
testing proficient in 2009 and 80 percent in 2010. If only 50 percent of the students test
proficient in 2009 the school fails to meet the performance target. In 2010, if 55 percent
of the students in the subgroup test proficient the school would classify as meeting the
performance goal. The passing rate is applied even though the 80 percent proficiency rate
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for the subgroup is not achieved. The 10 percent improvement in the number of students
listed in the subgroup is sufficient.
States were also allowed to determine if the schools would be offered additional
assistance in meeting performance targets by allowing them to report annual results or
averaged results. Some states created provisions that allowed schools to report annual
results if the annual results allowed them to meet the performance goal for that particular
year. If the annual results for a particular year fail to meet or exceed the performance
goal, then the schools could substitute annual results with the average scores of the last
two or three years if the average score was higher.
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) invested millions of dollars into the
development of accountability models that required states to demonstrate significant
progress in the performance of vulnerable racial and economic student groups and to
provide these students with educational alternatives (Patrick, 2012; Wong, 2008). Like
other reform efforts, the NCLB legislation focused on performance measures and
accountability as an effective means for improving vulnerable student outcomes.
Unfortunately, it fails to adequately consider the environment in which measures would
be developed and implemented.
Paul Light (2006) noted the importance of environmental considerations as well
as the dangers of investing in unsubstantiated claims of performance reform success and
noted there needed to be a “moratorium on new reforms until an independent body can
complete a detailed examination of just how past reforms have worked” (Light, 2006 pg.
17). Such an examination is particularly important as it relates to the understudied impact
that performance policies have on the lives of the most vulnerable citizens who are
largely dependent on elected officials and administrators to create policies that promote
equality and efficacy.
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Given the significance and understudied impact that performance reform policies
have on the lives of vulnerable citizens, this research responds to Light’s call by
examining the development and sanctioning provisions of the NCLB Act which targets
the performance of racial minorities, the economically disadvantaged, and other
vulnerable student subgroups. More specifically, it addresses two main questions: (1) Did
the organizational and political environments influence the strength of the individual
states’ NCLB subgroup accountability provisions targeting the performance of vulnerable
students? (2) Have states with stronger accountability provisions more effectively utilized
the transfer provision allowing vulnerable students to transfer from poorly performing
schools?
Building on the previous research (Patrick, 2012; Patrick and French, 2011;
Carnoy and Loeb, 2002; Nichols et. al., 2005), this study assesses the strength of
performance management reforms by capturing pertinent policy provisions of the NCLB
that required states to present a student population in which 100 percent of the racial
minorities and other vulnerable subgroups were proficient in selected subjects areas by
the end of the 2014 academic year.
Federal guidelines required states to incrementally enhance the outcomes of
targeted student subgroups and each state incorporated safe harbor provisions that
violated the spirit of the federal NCLB Act. The use of such techniques undermines the
assumption that meaningful provisions have been developed to adequately assess the
performance of specific marginalized subgroups. Furthermore, these safe-harbor
provisions implemented by the states limit the transfer provision which offers students
the opportunity to exit schools that consecutively fail to meet performance targets.
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Methodology
In order to ensure that all 50 states developed NCLB performance accountability
models federal legislation provided each state with a series of uniform accountability
questions that outlined how they would achieve 100 percent proficiency goal by the end
of the 2014 academic year. The responses provide a framework to conduct a content
analysis of the variations in the states’ accountability models. This type of analysis will
determine whether the individual states were committed to keeping the spirit of the
federal law by developing meaningful performance policies (Patrick, 2013).
Krippendroff describes the content analysis approach as, “the use of replicable
and valid method for making specific inferences from a text to other states or properties
of its source” (Krippendorff, 1969 p. 103). The content analysis approach examines
written documents looking for specific phrases, words, themes, or patterns in order to
group them into individual categories (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Once the categories are
created, the researcher must check for reliability by revising the categories after 10% –
50% of the document(s) have been assessed and then conduct a final working through of
the text (Mayring 2000).
Although accountability strength has been used as both an independent variable as
well as a dependent variable in previous studies (Patrick, 2013, Carnoy, Loeb, and Smith
2001, Nicholas et. al., 2005), it will be monitored in the second model by checking both
the tolerance and the variance inflation factor statistic. This research will use ordinary
least square regression (OLS) to assess the relationships in the research equation.
Although OLS is not the only possible estimator, it is the best estimator under certain
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assumptions including: (1) Regression is linear in parameters, (2) No correlation, (3) No
heteroskedasticity, (4) No multicollearity, (5) The error term is normally distributed.
Previous State Accountability Index
Several researchers including: Dee and Jacob (2011), Muller and Schiller (2000),
Hanushek and Raymond (2003), Carnoy (2005), Haney (2000), Carnoy, Loeb, and Smith
(2001), Lillard and DeCicca (2001), and Nichols et al. (2005) have developed
accountability measures that focus on NCLB. Many of these attempts have failed to
adequately assess the impact of the NCLB legislation due to measurement limitations
such as: small sample of states, unclear or questionable measurement techniques, and the
exclusion of elements important to performance management. Patrick (2007) created an
accountability index that assessed the strength of each state’s NCLB legislation.
Dependent Variable #1
Minority Performance Accountability Index
Unfortunately, the previous researchers failed to fully capture the NLCB policy
environment that specifically targets the vulnerable student populations, which are the
population that require the most attention. Therefore, this research builds on the research
of Patrick (2007) by utilizing the content analysis approach to develop an index that
focuses on all 50 states NCLB legislation. It specifically focuses on the four major
provisions from the federal NCLB legislation template provided to the states that address
vulnerable student populations as well as states that had performance systems in place
prior to the passage of NCLB.
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Each state was given the opportunity to decide how they would address the
following areas mentioned in this index in their respected state legislatures. The
categories being assessed in this research are as followed: (1) 10% Rule, (2) 75%
Confidence Interval, (3) Uniform Averaging, (4) Trajectory Selection, and (5) previous
performance systems. These categories are pivotal in determining the willingness of each
state to comply with the spirit of the NCLB federal legislation when reporting and
analyzing the results of vulnerable student populations. The maximum number of points a
state can receive in the index is 7. (See Appendix 1)
Safe Harbor Provisions
Marginalized populations are a major concern for the original Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) as well as the Reauthorized ESEA also known
as No Child Left Behind (NCLB). There are federal requirements in the NCLB
legislation that specifically focus on the achievement of subgroups in order to ensure that
they are benefiting from the policies. Unfortunately, it is very challenging for school
districts that have traditionally allowed marginalized populations including: racial and
ethnic minorities, disabled, economically disadvantaged, and limited English speaking
students to continue to fall astray to address and correct these historic ills in a short
period of time. Therefore, the federal NCLB legislation has provided these districts with
options when reporting and analyzing the results of vulnerable student populations. These
specific provisions in this performance index are commonly known as safe harbor
provisions. For this research, there are three safe harbor provisions being analyzed
including: the 10% rule, 75% confidence intervals, and uniform averaging. The
incorporation of safe harbor provision was assessed through varying responses to Critical
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Elements 3.2 and 5.2. Critical Element 3.2 asked: “How does the state accountability
system determine whether each student subgroup, public school and Local Education
Agencies (LEA) makes AYP?” Critical Element 5.2 asked: “How are public schools and
LEA’s held accountable for the progress of student subgroups in the determination of
adequate yearly progress?” (Critical Element 5.2).
10% Rule
The 10% rule allows the districts to report that they are meeting the requirements
of the legislation if there is 10% reduction in the amount of students from the previous
year that failed to meet AYP. This provision allows states to purposefully manipulate the
results and belittles the spirit of the federal NCLB legislation especially in its attempts to
address the educational achievement of marginalized populations. If a state chose to use
this policy they were given a score of (0) for the index; likewise, if a state chose not to
use this provision they were given a score of (1).
75 % Confidence Intervals
The use of 75% confidence intervals allows schools to manipulate the reported
scores of racial and economic subgroups in order to appear that they are meeting their
AYP goals. Patrick and French (2011) noted that the use of confidence intervals when
reporting the scores manipulates the accuracy and goes largely unnoticed by the citizenry.
Furthermore, several states would not have met their AYP goals had they not used the
safe-harbor provisions studied in this index (Peter, Linn, and Scott, 2005). Data on the
states confidence interval use was taken from legislation and cross validated with the
2010 US Department of education Data Express State Report. The report can be accessed
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at http://eddatateexpress.gov/state-tables-report.cfm. States that used the 75% confidence
interval when reporting their results received a (0) in the performance index. States
whose authorizing legislation did not include the use of confidence intervals received a
(1) on the performance index.
Uniform Averaging
Uniform averaging is a safe harbor provision that offers assistance in the
achievement of subgroup performance goals. Data on uniform averaging use was taken
from the state legislation and cross validated with the 2010 US Department of Education
Data Express State Report. States allowing schools to average test results and substitute
the results for low test outcomes received (0) in the performance index. State that do not
allow uniform averaging received (1) point in the index.
Trajectory Selection
According to the NCLB Act each state was required to have 100% proficiency by
the 2014 academic school year. The states were given the autonomy to decide how they
wanted to achieve this goal using two methods: incremental trajectory or a back-loaded
trajectory. The states that chose to implement the incremental plan pursued a more
realistic approach for holding the educators accountable while the Bush administration
was in office. The states that chose to back-load their trajectory selection purposefully
decided to attempt to wait until the Bush administration was out of office in hopes that
his successor would loosen the requirements. In order to assess states’ trajectory
selection, the following question was asked: “What are the State’s intermediate goals for
determining adequate yearly progress?” (Critical Element 3.2b). If a state chose to
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implement an incremental trajectory selection, and was forthright in its attempt to follow
the spirit of the federal NCLB legislation, it is given a (2) in the performance index for
this research. Furthermore, the states that chose the back-loaded approach were given a
(0) in the performance index.
Dependent Variable #2
Transfer Provision Usage
Most notable among the sanctions are those found in year two. The second
consecutive year that a school fails to meet performance goals, the district is required to
provide any student attending that school the option to transfer to another school. This
option punishes the underperforming school financially by removing funds that are
assigned to the students that choose to transfer from the underperforming school and
requiring them to pay for transportation to the new school (Brown, 2004). Success of the
transfer provision is defined as the percentage of eligible students transferring to higher
performing schools in 2010. Data for this variable was taken from the National Center for
Education Statistics (2006) data bank.
Hypotheses and Independent Variables
These independent variables have been included in other performance
effectiveness studies. However this study provides a unique examination of
accountability provisions targeting known areas of performance weakness. Knowledge of
these challenges should impact accountability strength and outcome. This assessment is
also unique in that few authors have assessed whether sanctions are effectively utilized
with performance accountability reforms.
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Political Variable


H.1. Republican states are more likely to implement strong accountability
systems.



H.2. Republican states are more likely to enforce NCLB sanctions.

In the Era of New Public Management, both Democrats and Republicans on the
national level have traditionally supported performance reform measures. The Democrats
have supported performance reforms (Gore, 1993; Winter, 2003). President Bill Clinton
spearheaded the national educational accountability movement with his Goals 2000
program. His domestic agenda called for nationalized standards, and national teacher
certification (Moe, 2003). However, the Democrats tend to gravitate toward voluntary
efforts that do not require voucher programs and other market efforts that reduce or
remove funding from public schools (Patrick, 2007).
Ironically, President Bush followed the footsteps of President Clinton and
introduced, “No Child Left Behind” as the centerpiece of his domestic agenda (Moe,
2003). This legislation reauthorized the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act
in an attempt to level the playing field for disadvantaged children throughout the nation.
The No Child Left Behind legislation introduced a national accountability system that
included sanctions, incentives, and rewards for performance on high-stakes test (Ravitch,
2002, Rudalevige, 2002). Given that the NCLB sanctions will result in a loss of funding
for poorly funded public schools, Democrats should be more opposed to using these
market techniques.
Political identification is defined as whether citizens in the state voted for the
Democratic (1) or Republican (0) candidate in the 2000 Presidential election. This time
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point was chosen because state policymakers began to develop and debate NCLB
legislation and guidelines in 2001.
Organizational Variables


H.3. States with strong teachers’ unions are less likely to implement strong
accountability systems.



H.4. States with strong teachers’ unions are less likely to enforce NCLB
sanctions.

Autonomy and control over the work environment is valued by public employees.
Research has shown that public employees do not respond positively to the strengthening
of accountability and oversight. McConnell (1971) found that university professors
responded negatively and became resentful of the tightening of accountability provisions
governing their functions. Rosenholtz (1987) added that teachers became frustrated when
they lost autonomy over how they performed their job. More recently Hochschild (2003)
noted that less than half of the teachers included in his assessment of NCLB
accountability supported the idea of linking a teacher’s rewards to student performance.
Like many of the other industries in which the employees have banned together
for collective bargaining purposes, teachers have found that they can successfully affect
policy outcomes via teacher unions. They have used their strength to: collectively bargain
for resources such as: job protection, higher salaries and benefits, etc. (Moe, 2011).
Moe (2011) also added that teachers’ unions tend to despise the use of
performance accountability models and sanctions due to the fact they are created to
protect the interests of the teachers and the unions. Hoschild (2003) noted that in the state
of Ohio, four out of five teachers added that they were worried about the unanticipated
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consequences of the NCLB legislation. More importantly, less than half of the teachers
questioned supported linking their reward and/or sanctions with student performance
(Hoschild, 2003).
Through an assessment of the National Association of Educator’s public
documents including its website and newsletters it is obvious that they adamantly oppose
the reforms introduced in the NCLB legislation. Hoxby (1996) noted that the presence of
teacher unions reduces productivity and has a negative effect on student performance.
Therefore, teachers’ union strength is defined as the percentage of public educators and
administrators who are members of education unions. Information on the 2001 union
membership was taken from the US Bureau of Labor and Statistics and 2001 NEA report.


H.5. States with greater administrative capacities are less likely to
implement strong accountability systems.



H.6. States with greater administrative capacities are less likely to enforce
NCLB sanctions.

NCLB legislation requires all 50 states to increase spending on test
administration. The increases in spending on physical test, data collection, analysis, and
reporting means that money will have to be diverted from other administrative functions
or areas. Several states protested the implementation of NCLB because of the increase in
administrative cost (Patrick and French, 2011). States with greater administrative
capacity and experience with the nuisances of testing and reporting should be less
inclined to build stronger accountability systems.
For the purpose of this dissertation administrative capacity is defined as the
percentage of state educational workforce which is composed of school and district
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administrators in 1998. Data for the variable was taken from the National Center for
Education Statistic (2006). The time point of 1998 was selected because it was the most
recent data available prior to the passage of NCLB. It allows the model to account for
knowledge of administrative capabilities that would have been considered as state
policymakers debated the development of critical NCLB elements.


H.7. States with a history of high academic performance are less likely to
implement strong accountability systems.



H.8. States with a history of high academic performance are less likely to
enforce NCLB sanctions.

Increased transparency and fear of public ridicule for failing to meet performance
have caused government entities with a history of high performance to implement weaker
performance measures (Ho and Ni 2005). Previous assessments of education
accountability models by Carnoy and Loeb’s (2002) also suggested a negative
relationship between past performance and strength of accountability policies. Like
Carnoy and Loeb (2002) this study incorporates National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP) test results as a measure of past performance. The NAEP is a national
standardized exam that measures students' academic knowledge. The research utilizes
2003 8th grade math results.


H.9. States with a highly skilled education workforce are less likely to
implement strong accountability systems.



H.10. States with a highly skilled workforce are less likely to enforce
NCLB sanctions.
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NLCB accountability centralizes control and weakens the autonomy and
discretion of skilled professionals. Public administration literature has noted the
importance that educated professionals place on autonomy and professional
accountability (Peters, 2002, Kettl, 1990; Finer, 1941). In the field of education the loss
of autonomy and strengthening of accountability undermined employee trust (McConnell,
1971; Platt and Parson, 1973). Highly skilled workforce is defined as the percentage of
state teachers who held a Master’s degree or higher in 2003. Data for the variable was
taken from the NCES) data bank.
Economic Variables


H.11. States with better-funded school systems are less likely to
implement strong accountability systems.



H.12. States with better-funded school systems are less likely to enforce
NCLB sanctions.

The relationship between spending per pupil and performance accountability has
produced conflicting results. Carnoy and Loeb (2002) presented research noting that
states that spent more per pupil during the 1990s had stronger accountability systems.
However, increases in per pupil spending did not translate into significant increases in
measured outcomes. Nichols et. al. (2005) produced results arguing that spending per
pupil had no effect on state accountability or education performance outcome. Pan,
Rudo, Schneider, and Smith-Hansen (2003) reported a significant positive relationship
between spending per pupil and student performance. Given that many of the states
openly opposed federal NCLB reforms, the dissertation asserts that states that were less
dependent on the federal government for funding were less inclined to implement and
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enforce challenging performance measures. Spending per pupil is defined as the amount
of money the individual states allocates for public education divided by the amount of
students enrolled in the public education system. Data was taken from the US
Department of Education website (2000).


H.13. States with large minority student populations are less likely to
implement strong accountability systems.



H.14. States with large minority student populations are less likely to
enforce NCLB sanctions.

Research has shown that minority students tend to perform poorly on standardized
exams (Orr, 2000; Rusaw, 2007). Osborne (1999) and Steele (1992) also noted that
minority students tend to have higher dropout rates, below average standardized test
scores, and below average retention rate. Reyes and Stanic (1998) Demo and Parker
(1987) and Whitworth and Barrientos (1990) noted that minority students have
traditionally underperformed when being compared to their White counterparts.
Preexisting knowledge of minority test scores and the challenges associated with
meeting performance targets for vulnerable student subgroups should lead state policy
makers to adopt stronger accountability systems (Carnoy and Loeb, 2002, Nichols et. al.
2005, and Carnoy, 2005). Kane and Staiger (2003) noted that although there have been
longstanding differences in test performances amongst the races, subgroup rules are
counterproductive in test-based accountability systems. Furthermore, the subgroup rules
will result in fewer resources and more sanctions for schools that have a larger percentage
of minority students because they do not positively affect test scores for minority students
(Kane and Staiger, 2003).
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Minority student population is defined as the percentage of state African
American and Hispanic students in 2000. Information on minority population was taken
from the US Department of Education’s “State Education Indicators Report” electronic
report at http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/disadv/2002indicators/edlite-summ.html.
Performance Index Independent Variable
H. 15 States with stronger subgroup accountability provisions are more



likely to enforce NCLB sanctions.
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Figure 3
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FINDINGS

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Spend Per Pupil

4.77

10.73

7.48

1.46

2000 Voting

.00

1.00

.40

.49

% Minority

2.00

54.00

23.52

15.85

Admin. Capacity

22.10

50.10

40.76

4.72

M.A. Degree +

26.10

50.10

40.76

4.72

NEA

8.30

82.40

41.36

18.12

2003 Math

261.00

291.00

277.44

7.45

Accountability
Index
Transfer
Provision

.00

6.00

3.22

1.79

10

79.90

3.78

11.83

The average score for spending per pupil is 7.48 with a maximum of 10.73 and a
minimum of 4.77. Utah is the state with the lowest percentage of spending per pupil with
a score of 4.77 with Tennessee, Mississippi, Idaho, Alabama, Arizona, and Arkansas
were not far behind. New York is the state with the highest score for spending per pupil
with a 10.73 with Connecticut, and Rhode Island very close to it.
59

The variations throughout the states were very apparent in the race, union
membership, and teacher education variables. There is a 52-point difference between the
states with the highest and lowest percentage of Blacks and Hispanic children enrolled in
the public education system. There are twelve states with single digit percentages of
Black and Hispanic youth enrolled in the public education system with Maine, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont at the bottom with only 2%. Texas leads the nation
in percentage of minorities enrolled with 54% with New Mexico and Mississippi not far
behind.
Likewise, there is a 74.1-point difference between the states percentage of
teachers belonging to the NEA. There are 8 states with less than 20% of the teachers
belong to the NEA and seventeen states with more than half of the teachers belonging to
the NEA. New York and Texas have the least amount of teachers enrolled in the NEA
with less than 9% and Washington and Nevada lead the nation with NEA membership
with more than 75% of the teachers belonging to the NEA.
The 2003 Math performance variable proved to be very interesting; the average
score for past performance is 277.44. Minnesota, Massachusetts, and North Dakota lead
the nation in past performance. The lower performing states were roughly 16 points
below the average score and 30 points behind the leading states. The descriptive results
show that three (Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi) of the bottom six performing
states are Southern states and most of the flourishing states are from the North East.
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Table 2

Full Model with Performance Index Dependent Variable

Independent Variables
(Constant)
Spend Per Pupil
2000 Voting
% Minority
Admin. Capacity
M.A. Degree +
NEA
2003 Math
Adjusted R Square = .251
F Statistic = 3.254**
N Value = 47
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
-33.436
-.274
.483
.059
.006
.002
-.036
.138

T-value
-2.624 *
-1.097
.740
2.717 **
.105
.085
-2.301 *
2.835 **

Table 2 examines the strength of the full model and test the relationship of the
political, economic, and organizational variables to the accountability index. The full
model has an Adjusted R-Square of =.251 which means that these specific independent
variables address roughly 25% of the variance in the accountability index. Percentage of
Blacks and Hispanics in the public education system, percentage of teachers that belong
to the NEA, and 2003 eighth grade math scores are the three statistically significant
independent variables. Of three statistically significant independent variables NEA
membership is the only one that has a negative relationship to the accountability index.
The negative relationship between NEA membership and the accountability index
indicates that as the percentage of teachers belonging to the NEA increases the less likely
the state is to develop meaningful performance measures that affect its minority student
population. These results support the hypothesis that suggest that states with high
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percentages of unionized workers would implement less strenuous performance
measurement systems.
The regression also shows a statistically significant relationship between
percentage of minorities and states willingness to implement meaningful performance
measurement systems. The regression indicates that this variable is significant at the 95%
confidence level. As the percentage of Blacks and Hispanic students enrolled in the
public education system increases the willingness to create meaningful performance
measures also increased. This finding rejects the research hypothesis that indicates that
states with higher percentage of Blacks and Hispanics enrolled in the public education
system would implement weaker accountability systems.
The final and most important independent variable in the full model regression
output is the past performance variable. The past performance variable in this regression
is the 2003 8th grade math scores from the NAEP website. The results reveal a positive
relationship between past performance and the states willingness to implement
meaningful performance measurements.
Now that the full model has been discussed, I will discuss the independent
variables individually. I have ran simple linear models on each of the independent
variables in order to test their relevance to the dependent variable.
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Table 3

Political Variable: 2000 Presidential Voting impact on the Performance
Index

(Constant)
2000 Presidential Voting
Adjusted R Square = -.010
F Statistic = .493
N Value = 49
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
3.367
-.367

T-value
10.197 sig ***
-.702

Table 3 examines the relationship between the political environment and states’
willingness to adopt a meaningful performance index that specifically affects
marginalized populations. The regression output indicates that 2000 presidential voting is
not statistically significant. This finding refutes the hypothesis, ‘Republican states are
more likely to implement strong accountability systems.’ Although this finding
contradicts the hypothesis it further explains the complexity of the NCLB legislation.
The NCLB legislation was implemented under a Republican president shortly
after one of the most controversial presidential elections in the history of the country.
Furthermore, the major components of the NCLB legislation were introduced earlier
during the Clinton administration, championed by the late Democratic Senator Ted
Kennedy. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the political variable did not prove to
be statistically significant due to the bipartisan support of the NCLB legislation.
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Table 4

Organizational Variable: Percentage of NEA Membership Impact on the
Performance Index

Independent Variables
(Constant)
% of NEA Membership
Adjusted R Square = .154
F Statistic = 9.949 sig .003
N Value = 49
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
4.921
-.041

T-value
8.371 sig ***
-3.154 sig **

Table 4 assesses the relationship between union membership and states
performance accountability strength. According to the results the union membership is
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and has a negative relationship with
the accountability index. As the percentage of teachers belonging to the NEA increases,
the strenuous of the minority accountability systems decreases. This regression output
supports the hypothesis, ‘States with strong teachers’ unions are less likely to implement
strong accountability systems.’
This regression output supports Terry Moe’s (2011) claim that teachers, when
unionized, ban together and successfully affect policy outcomes. More specifically, Moe
notes that teacher unions tend to despise the use of performance accountability models.
Furthermore, this finding is the only independent variable from the full model that
remains statistically significant when regressed alone with the dependent variable.
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Table 5

Organizational Variable: Administrative Capacity Impact on the
Performance Index

Independent Variables
(Constant)
Admin. Capacity
Adjusted R Square = .015
F Statistic = 1.755
N Value = 49
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
.306
.071

T-value
.138
1.325

Table 5 examines the relationship between administrative capacity and states’
accountability index strength. The results reveal that administrative capacity is not
statistically significant and does not affect the states’ accountability systems. Therefore,
hypothesis 5 which states, "States with greater administrative capacities are less likely to
implement strong accountability systems" must be refuted.
Table 6

Organizational Variable: Past Performance Impact on the Performance
Index

Independent Variables
(Constant)
2003 8th Grade Math
Adjusted R Square = -.020
F Statistic = .041
N Value = 49
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
1.266
.007

T-value
.131
.202

This table examines the relationship between past performance and states’
willingness to adopt meaningful accountability measures. The regression output indicates
that this independent variable is not statistically significant in the simple linear regression
reduced model. The R Square for this regression estimation is a very low -.020 signifying
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that less than one percent of the variance in states’ willingness to enact meaningful
accountability systems is explained by past academic performance of the students. This
finding rejects the hypothesis that suggest, "States with a history of high academic
performance are less likely to implement strong accountability systems."
Table 7

Organizational Variable: Teacher Education Impact on the Performance
Index

Independent Variables
(Constant)
2004 % with M.A. +
Adjusted R Square = -.017
F Statistic = .167
N Value = 49
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
3.622
-.009

T-value
3.559 sig ***
-.409

Table 7 assesses the relationship between teachers’ education and states’
willingness to implement meaningful accountability systems. The regression output
indicates that teachers’ level of advanced education is not statistically significant. The R
Square for this regression estimation is very low -.017 signifying that less than one
percent of the states’ willingness to enact meaningful accountability systems is explained
by the level of education of the teachers. This finding refutes the hypothesis, "States with
a highly skilled education workforce are less likely to implement strong accountability
system."
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Table 8

Economic Variable: Spending Per Pupil Impact on the Performance Index

Independent Variables
(Constant)
Spending Per Pupil
Adjusted R Square = -.013
F Statistic = .391
N Value = 49
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
4.049
-.111

T-value
3.000 **
-.629

Table 8 presents the regression estimates for the first of two economic variables.
The results reveal that spending per pupil is not statistically significant in the reduced
linear regression model. The R Square for this regression estimation is very low -.013
signifying that less than one percent of the variance in states’ willingness to enact
meaningful accountability systems is explained by the amount of money it spends per
student. This finding rejects the hypothesis that suggests that states’ with better-funded
school systems are less likely to implement strong accountability systems.
Table 9

Economic Variable: Percentage of Minority Students Impact on the
Performance Index

Independent Variables
(Constant)
% Black and Hispanic
Adjusted R Square = .098
F Statistic = 6.096
N Value = 47
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
2.265
.039

T-value
5.043 sig ***
2.469 sig *

Table 9 shows the simple linear regression results of the second of the two
economic variables from the full model. The results indicate that the percentage of
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minority students enrolled in the public education systems is statistically significant in the
simple linear regression. The R Square for this regression estimation is a very low .098
signifying that less than ten percent of the variance in states’ willingness to enact
meaningful accountability systems is explained by the percentage of Black and Hispanic
students enrolled in the public education system. This finding refutes the hypothesis that
states with large minority student populations are less likely to implement strong
accountability systems, since they are slightly more likely to implement strong
accountability systems.
Table 10

Full Model with Student Transfer as Dependent Variable

Independent Variable
Spending Per Pupil
2000 Presidential Voting
Minority Enrollment
Administrative Capacity
Masters +
NEA Membership
2003 Math
Performance Index
Constant
Adjusted R Square = .121
F Statistic = 1.720
N Value = 42
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-Value
-1.817
1.529
.026
-.155
-.195
-.199
.605
-2.924
-118.323

t-value
-.957
.313
.138
-.392
-1.085
-1.645
1.513
-2.431*
-1.150

Table 10 examines the strength of the full model and tests the relationships of the
political, economic, organizational variables, and the accountability index to the
dependent variable. The model has an Adjusted R-Square of =.121 which means that
these specific independent variables address roughly 12% of the variance in the decision
to utilize the transfer provision. The only statistically significant independent variable in
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this model is the Accountability Index, which was the dependent variable in the previous
model, but the slope is opposite of the hypothesis sign.
The regression indicates the Accountability Index variable is significant at the
95% confidence level. As the percentage of scores for each state increased on the
Accountability Index their citizen’s willingness to utilize the performance index
decreased. This finding rejects the research hypothesis that indicates that states with
higher scores on the Accountability Index are more likely to utilize the sanctioning
provisions of the NCLB Act.
Now that the full model has been discussed, I will discuss the independent
variables individually. I have ran simple linear models on each of the independent
variables in order to test their relevance to the dependent variable.
Table 11

Impact on Decision to Utilize the Transfer Provision

Independent Variables
(Constant)
2000 Presidential Voting
Adjusted R Square = .005
F Statistic = 1.208
N Value = 44
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
5.359
-3.948

T-value
2.359**
-1.099

Table 11 examines the relationship between the political environment and
citizens’ willingness to sanction poorly performing schools by utilizing the transfer
provision and relocating their children in higher performing schools. The adjusted Rsquare is .005 signifying that less than 1% of the variance is explained by the political
variable in the regression. Furthermore, the regression output indicates that 2000
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presidential voting is not a statistically significant variable. This finding refutes the
hypothesis, "Republican states are more likely to enforce NCLB sanctions."
Table 12

NEA Membership Impact on Decision to Utilize the Transfer Provision

Independent Variables
(Constant)
NEA Membership
Adjusted R Square = -.015
F Statistic = .339
N Value = 44
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
6.030
-.055

T-value
1.417
-.582

Table 12 assesses the relationship between NEA membership and citizens’
willingness to sanction poorly performing schools by utilizing the transfer provision and
relocating their children in higher performing schools. According to the regression
output, there is a negative relationship between NEA membership and citizens’ decision
to sanction poorly performing schools although the NEA membership is not statistically
significant. As the percentage of teachers belonging to the NEA increases’ the
willingness to utilize the transfer provision decreases. This regression output refutes the
hypothesis, "States with strong teachers’ unions are less likely to enforce NCLB
sanctions."
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Table 13

Administrative Capacity Impact on Decision to Utilize the Transfer
Provision

Independent Variables
(Constant)
Administrative Capacity

b-value
13.452
-.237

T-value
.892
-.646

Adjusted R Square = -.013
F Statistic = .417
N Value = 44
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05
Table 13 examines the relationship between administrative capacity and citizens’
willingness to sanction poorly performing schools by utilizing the transfer provision and
relocating their children in higher performing schools. The adjusted R-square is -.013,
which indicates that less than 1% of the variance is explained by the administrative
capacity independent variable. The regression output reveals that administrative capacity
is not statistically significant and does not affect the citizens’ decision to utilize the
transfer provision. Hypothesis 6, which states, "States with greater administrative
capacities are less likely to enforce NCLB sanctions" must be refuted.
Table 14

Past Math Scores Impact on Decision to Utilize the Transfer Provision

Independent Variables
(Constant)
Past Math Avg.
Adjusted R Square = -.003
F Statistic = .875
N Value = 44
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
-58.458
.225
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T-value
-.879
.936

Table 14 examines the relationship between past performance and citizens’
willingness to sanction poorly performing schools by utilizing the transfer provision and
relocating their children in higher performing schools. The regression output indicates
that this independent variable is not statistically significant in the simple linear regression
reduced model. The R Square for this regression estimation is a very low -.003 signifying
that less than one percent of the variance in states’ willingness to utilize the transfer
provision is explained by past academic performance of the students. This finding rejects
the hypothesis that suggests, "States with a history of high academic performance are less
likely to enforce NCLB sanctions."
Table 15

Percentage of Teachers’ Advanced Degrees Impact on Decision to Utilize
the Transfer Provision

Independent Variables
(Constant)
M.A. +
Adjusted R Square = .070
F Statistic = 4.332 sig .043
N Value = 44
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
18.294
-.301

T-value
2.549 *
-2.081*

Table 15 examines the relationship between the education levels of the teachers
and the citizens’ willingness to sanction poorly performing schools by utilizing the
transfer provision and relocating their children in higher performing schools. The
regression output indicates that this independent variable is statistically significant at the
95% confidence level in the simple linear regression reduced model. As the percentage of
teachers with master degrees or higher increases, the citizens’ decision to utilize the
transfer provision decreases. The R-square for this regression estimation is .070
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signifying that the teachers’ levels of advanced education explain 7 percent of the
variance in states’ willingness to utilize the transfer provision. This finding supports the
hypothesis that states "States with a highly skilled workforce are less likely to enforce
NCLB sanctions."
Table 16

Spending Per Pupil Impact on Decision to Utilize the Transfer Provision

Independent Variables
(Constant)
Spending Per Pupil
Adjusted R Square = .002
F Statistic = 1.081
N Value = 44
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
13.283
-1.269

T-value
1.427
-1.040

Table 16 examines the relationship between spending per pupil and citizens’
willingness to sanction poorly performing schools by utilizing the transfer provision and
relocating their children in higher performing schools. The regression output indicates
that this independent variable is not statistically significant in the simple linear regression
reduced model. The R Square for this regression estimation is a very low .002 signifying
that less than one percent of the variance in states’ willingness to utilize the transfer
provision is explained by the economic variable, "spending per pupil." This finding
rejects the hypothesis that suggests, "States with better-funded school systems are less
likely to enforce NCLB sanctions."
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Table 17

Percentage of Minorities Enrolled Impact on Decision to Utilize the
Transfer Provision

Independent Variables
(Constant)
Minority Population
Adjusted R Square = .021
F Statistic = 1.906
N Value = 42
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
8.181
-.169

T-value
2.248 *
-1.381

Table 17 shows the simple linear regression results of the second of the two
economic variables from the full model. It assesses the minority student enrollment
relationship to the citizens’ decision to utilize the transfer provision of the NCLB Act.
The results indicate that the percentage of minority students enrolled in the public
education systems is not statistically significant in the simple linear regression. The R
Square for this regression estimation is a very low .021 signifying that less than one
percent of the variance in citizens’ decision to utilize the transfer provision is explained
by the percentage of Black and Hispanic students enrolled in the public education system.
This finding refutes the hypothesis that suggests that states with large minority student
populations are more likely to enforce NCLB sanctions.
Table 18

Performance Index Impact on Decision to Utilize the Transfer Provision

Independent Variables
(Constant)
Performance Index
Adjusted R Square = .052
F Statistic = 3.426*
N Value = 44
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
9.293
-1.723
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T-value
** 2.703 sig .010
-1.851 sig .070

Table 18 shows the simple linear regression results of the first dependent variable
(Accountability Index) relation to the citizens’ decision to utilize the transfer provision.
The results indicate that the Accountability Index is not statistically significant in the
simple linear regression. The R Square for this regression estimation is very low .052
signifying that states’ accountability index scores explain roughly 5 percent of the
variance in citizens’ decision to utilize the transfer provision. This finding refutes the
hypothesis that suggests that states with higher accountability index scores are less likely
to enforce NCLB sanctions.
Table 19

Reduced Model: Significant Variables Impact on the Performance Index

Independent Variables
(Constant)
Minority
NEA
Past Math
Adjusted R Square = .296
F Statistic = 7.580 ***
N Value = 47
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
-29.207
.057
-.034
.117

T-value
-2.623 *
2.925 **
-2.535 *
2.992 **

Table 19 examines the strength of the significant independent variables from the
full model in Table 2. The adjusted R-square is .296, which indicates that these three
independent variables address roughly 29% of the variance in the performance index. As
noted earlier, Hypothesis 13, ‘States with large minority student populations are less
likely to implement strong accountability systems,’ is not upheld in this regression
equation. This output suggests the exact opposite; states with larger percentages of
minorities are more likely to adopt strenuous performance accountability systems. This
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can be attributed to the fact that states with larger percentages of minorities received
more Title 1 federal money than states with fewer minorities. Therefore, they are more
likely to abide by the federal mandates in order to obtain the federal funds that they are
eligible to receive.
NEA membership is statistically significant in the reduced model represented in
Table 19. As hypothesized, as the percentage of teachers belonging to the NEA increases
the level of strenuousness put into the performance accountability systems decreases. The
NEA publically denounces the NCLB Act and encourages its members to disregard the
provisions of the legislation. Therefore, it is no surprise that the findings in this
regression coincides with the findings of Hoxby (1996). He noted that the presence of
teachers unions reduces the productivity.
Table 20

Reduced Model: Selected Variables Impact on Transfer Provision

Independent Variables
(Constant)
Performance Index
Masters +
Adjusted R Square = .138
F Statistic = 4.532 *
N Value = 44
*** = .001
** = .01
* = .05

b-value
25.233
-1.864
-.321

T-value
3.293 **
-2.095 *
-2.301 *

This reduced model uses the transfer provision as the dependent variable and
shows the relationship it has with the performance index as well as the independent
variable that focuses on a highly skilled workforce. Although it has a fairly low Adjusted
R-square, both of the independent variables in this model are statistically significant. As
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the percentage of highly skilled teachers increase, the likelihood of the transfer provision
usage decreases.
This model coincides with the hypothesis; ‘States with a highly skilled workforce
are less likely to enforce NCLB sanctions,’ which supports the work of Peters, Kettl, and
Finer. These authors recognized the importance that educated professionals place on
autonomy and professional accountability. Furthermore, it supports the research of
McConnell and Platt and Parson. They noted that in the field of education, the loss of
autonomy and strengthening of accountability undermined employee trust (McConnell,
1971 and Platt and Parson, 1973).
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CONCLUSION

Efforts to promote efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability have remained
some of the major focus areas in the field of Public Administration. In the Classical
School of Public Administration, accountability was pursued by focusing on the
importance of control, stability, uniformity, and rules that limited employees’ autonomy.
The Classical Era of Public Administration ignored the human aspect of employment and
created environments that were of poor quality and due to employee stress (Simon, 1982,
Kettl, 1990). As a result, the scholars and practitioners in the Behaviorist Era of Public
Administration sought to correct the errors of the Classical Era by studying the
importance of the human element in employment. Individuals such as Elton Mayo,
Abraham Maslow, and Douglass McGregor introduced studies that focused on the
motivation factors that affected the employees within organizations. The single most
significant set of events that characterized the Behaviorist Era was the multiyear work
done by Elton Mayo at the Western Electric Company. “The Hawthorn experiments
showed that complex, interactional variables make the difference in motivating peoplethings like attention paid to workers as individuals, workers’ control over their work,
differences between individuals’ needs, the willingness of managers to listen, group
norms, and direct feedback” (Ott, et. al., 2008 pg. 132-3).
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Although the behaviorists sought to achieve efficiency and effectiveness by
emphasizing the human element of public administration, they achieved limited longterm success due to the fact that they failed to adequately address the lack of equity and
fairness in public organizations. As a result, New Public Administration (NPA) was
introduced as an attempt to address the concerns of dissatisfied citizens. NPA attempted
to revitalize the citizenry trust in government by implementing rules and regulations that
prohibited governmental agencies from discriminating against previously marginalized
populations.
During the Era of NPA, public administration was overly concerned with equity
and fairness and this decision gravely affected overarching basic tenants of the discipline
including: accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness. Since the late 1980’s, supporters
of the New Public Management (NPM) movement have suggested that the most optimal
way to ensure that these components are met are to incorporate quantitative measures of
outcomes, employee and organizational accountability sanctions, and the public reporting
of the results. Although the concerns of NPM are warranted, there is a lack of evidence to
suggest that the solutions offered by the proponents adequately address the problems of
public administration (Kirlin, 2001). Paul Light echoed these sentiments and suggested
placing a moratorium on new reforms until independent researchers can complete a
detailed examination of the previous reforms (Light, 2006).
Understanding the validity of Light’s concern, especially as it relates to
previously marginalized populations, this dissertation builds on the work of Patrick
(2013) and uses the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) to empirically test the
effectiveness of NPM. It developed a performance index with scores ranging from zero to
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seven and assigned each state a performance index score based on the presence or
absence of specific components of the NCLB legislation that relates to marginalized
populations. This research addresses three major areas that are critical to the performance
reform movement including: (1) examining whether policymakers and administrators will
operate under the veil of ignorance and create meaningful and challenging performance
accountability systems, (2) assessing the role organizational, economical, and political
variables play in the development of performance measures or accountability systems
that target marginalized populations, and (3) assessing whether the presence of strong
accountability systems produce the desired outcomes of empowering citizens with
sanctioning options.
The findings raise serious questions regarding the individual state legislatures and
their concern for the future of public education in their respective states. Furthermore,
they suggest that policymakers and administrators did not operate under the veil of
ignorance and create meaningful and challenging performance accountability systems.
The average score on the performance index was 3.22 out of 7. This score suggests that
most of the states utterly violated the spirit of the NCLB federal legislation and
purposefully disregarded its attempts to revamp the public education system. Appendix 1
shows that every state with the exception of New York, Wyoming, and Vermont decided
to use the 10% rule when reporting minority scores. This decision completely violates the
intent of the 2001 NCLB Act as well as the original 1965 Elementary and Secondary
Education Act. Minorities have traditionally been left behind in the public education
system and to allow schools to use the 10% rule when reporting minority scores is
counterproductive and irresponsible.
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Furthermore, Appendix 1 shows that more than half of the states decided to use
the back-loaded trajectory approach when setting their adequate yearly progress goals.
The decision to use this approach shows a complete disregard for the federal NCLB
policy and an attempt to circumvent the law. Fortunately, the Obama administration
supports the NCLB Act and incorporated many of the basic tenents of the legislation in
his ‘Race to the Top’ initiative. The decision to support the NCLB legislation speaks to
the bipartisan support the legislation enjoyed from federal policy makers on both sides of
the political aisle.
Next, this dissertation incorporated several important organizational, economical,
and political variables that specifically address the environment in which the decisions
were during the implementation phase of the NCLB legislation. The political variable
used in this dissertation was the political direction each state chose in the 2000
presidential election. This variable was chosen for two major reasons: (1) the 2000
presidential election was one of the most polarizing elections in the history of the United
States of America. The two candidates had very clear-cut agendas that offered the
American people two vastly different alternative directions in which the country would
be headed. (2) The 2000 presidential election was chosen because shortly after the
election President George W. Bush chose to make NCLB the centerpiece of his domestic
agenda.
The literature suggested that Democratic states are less likely to support efforts
that tend to incorporate market efforts that reduce or remove funding from public schools,
especially poor public schools. Furthermore, the Republicans have supported marketcentered reforms at the expense of poor individuals and poorly funded organizations.
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Therefore, this dissertation hypothesized that Republicans states would be more likely to
implement strong accountability systems and support the enforcement of sanctions. The
regression results refuted the notion that the political environment in each state affected
the states decision to implement meaningful performance accountability systems, nor did
it suggest that the political environment affected the citizens’ decisions to sanction poorly
performing schools. These results help explain the level of bipartisan support the NCLB
Act enjoyed. Although the Republican president, George W. Bush championed it, the late
Senator Ted Kennedy (Democrat) considered it a major victory and supported it
wholeheartedly.
This dissertation used specific organizational variables to gauge the environment
of each state as it was originally implementing the NCLB Act including: percentage of
teachers belonging to the National Educators Association (NEA), percentage of
educational workforce that is composed of school and district administrators, past
academic performance, and percentage of teachers with advanced academic degrees.
These variables were specifically chosen primarily because they specifically address the
uniqueness of each state’s organizational environment during the critical months
surrounding the decision to implement meaningful performance measurements.
The regression indicates that the percentage of teachers belonging to the NEA
teachers union does indeed affect the willingness of each state to create meaningful
performance measures. More specifically, it supports the hypothesis that notes that
percentage of teachers belonging to the NEA does affect states’ willingness to enact
meaningful NCLB legislation. As NEA membership in the individual states increases,
their willingness to enact meaningful performance policies decreases. This finding is
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supported by the NEA’s website which directly condemns the NCLB legislation and the
incident that occurred in Washington, D.C. with the superintendent Michelle Rhee. After
months of campaigning and selling the ideas pay-for-performance to the teachers within
the district she finally galvanized enough votes to remove tenure and implement marketcentered reforms. On the night of the vote, the leaders of the teachers union in D.C.
refused to allow the teachers to vote on the issue, out of fear that their position on the
issues might be in jeopardy.
Ironically, the hypothesis that suggest that states with strong teachers’ unions,
previous history of success, significant administrative capacities, and with a large
percentage of highly educated teachers are less likely to enforce NCLB sanctions were
not supported by the regression output. This might be a result of several factors, including
the limited options for parents. In most rural areas there is only one option for public
education which limits the parents’ ability to adequately utilize the sanctioning provision
of NCLB and sanction the poorly performing schools by removing their children from the
school. This dilemma gravely affects the ability of NCLB to live out its true intentions
and might be the answer to why so few parents actually utilize their sanctioning option.
Another possible explanation as to why the organizational variables in the second
regression equation are not significant might be attributed to the lack of knowledge about
the specifics of the NCLB Act. In order to get the NCLB Act through Congress, the
federal government was forced to be very lenient on the states regarding specific
instructions. As noted earlier and depicted in Appendix 1, some states purposely allowed
the school districts to mislead the parents regarding their progress. Furthermore, some
states allow the school districts to deliver the results to the parents at inconvenient times.
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For example, the school districts in some states are not required to inform the parents
before the next academic year has begun, knowing that the odds of a parent removing
their children from a failing school once the semester has begun is very unlikely.
This dissertation then used two economic variables to gauge the climate of each
state around the time the NCLB legislation was enacted. The economic variables chosen
to conduct the analysis were percentage of Blacks and Hispanics enrolled in the public
education system and percentage of money each state allocates to each individual student.
These variables were chosen because they directly affect the willingness of states to
invest in the education of the youth. The regression suggested that spending per pupil was
not statistically significant and did not address the willingness of states’ to enact
meaningful performance measures. This may be attributed to the fact that cost of living
varies from state to state so drastically that amount of money allocated to each individual
is directly affected by the differences in the cost of living from state to state. Therefore, it
is impossible to gauge the states’ willingness to enact meaningful performance measures
based on the amount they allocate per child enrolled in the public education system.
However, percentage of minority students enrolled in the public education system
did prove to have meaningful significance when analyzing the economic climate of states
and their willingness to enact meaningful performance systems. As the percentage of
minority students increased in the individual states’, so did the states’ willingness to enact
meaningful performance measurement systems. This might be attributed to the fact that
the Bush Administration promised to increase the amount of money allocated for the
enactment of the NCLB policies by billions especially for the provisions that directly
affected disadvantaged minorities. “[D]uring the 2003 fiscal year approximately $11.7
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billion was appropriated for Title 1 spending (funds given to states to improve the
education of disadvantaged students, increase teacher quality, and turn around low
performing schools). This accounted for nearly half of the $23.7 billion that was
appropriated for the Act” (Patrick, 2007). States merely set up performance
accountability systems to appease the federal government in order to receive the federal
funds.
Finally, this dissertation analyzes the impact of the performance accountability
systems on citizen’s decision to utilize the sanctioning provision provided to them in the
NCLB legislation. The results indicate that strength of performance accountability
systems does have a statistically significant impact on the decision to utilize the
sanctioning provision. As the states create and implement stronger accountability models,
the less likely they are to utilize the transfer provision. This can be attributed to the fact
that the NCLB Act was seriously diluted at the state level. In order to get the federal
legislation passed through congress the NCLB Act had to include discretionary provision
for the states. Unfortunately, the states violated the spirit of the legislation and totally
disregarded the major intent of the program.
Therefore, with a clearer understanding of the violation of the principal agent
relationship between the federal policy makers and the individual states, it is important to
understand that it is premature to suggest that the performance reform movement is or is
not working. This dissertation suggests that the NCLB Act is indeed a good case study
for the performance reform movement as long as it is implemented according to the spirit
of the federal legislation. Once the principal agent relationship was violated and the
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system is shirked at the state level it is impossible to test the effectiveness of the
legislation.

86

REFERENCES
Archbald, Douglas. (2004). School Choice, Magnet Schools, and the Liberation Model:
An Empirical Study. Sociology of Education, 77 (4): 283-310.
Barnard, Chester. (1968). The Functions of the Executive. Harvard University Press.
Harvard, MA
Brown, C., Lopez-Medina, L., & Reed, R (2004). “Choosing Better Schools: A Report on
Student Transfers Under the No Child Left Behind Act.” Report of the Citizens’
Commission on Civil Rights. Washington, DC: Rock Creek Publishing.
Bush, George. (2001). No Child Left Behind. Retrieved from
http://education.ucf.edu/mirc/Research/NCLB%20-%20Bush.pdf on 10-3-2013
Caiden, N. (1998). “Public Service Professionalism for Performance Measurement and
Evaluation.” Public Budgeting and Finance. Vol. 18 Issue 2
Carnoy, Martin. (2005). “Have State Accountability and High Stakes Tests Influenced
Student Progression Rates in High School?” Educational Measures: Issues and
Practice 24, no. 4:19-31.
Carnoy, M., & Loeb, S. (2002). “Does External Accountability Affect Student
Outcomes? A Cross-State Analysis.” Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis,
24 (4): 305-331.
Carnoy, M., Loeb, S., and Smith, T. (2001). “Do Higher State Test Scores in Texas Make
for Better High School Outcomes?” Consortium for the Policy Research in
Education University of Pennsylvania Graduate School of Education
Chubb, J. and Moe, T. (1990). “Should Market Forces Control Educational Decision
Making?” The American Political Science Review Vol. 84 Number 2.
Cooper, Camille. (2005). “School Choice and the Standpoint of African American
Mothers: Considering the Power of Positionality.” The Journal of Negro
Education, 74 (2): 174-189.
DeBray, Elizabeth (2006). Politics, Ideology, and Education. Federal Policy During the
Clinton and Bush Administration. Teachers College Press. New York, NY.
87

Dee, T.S. and Jacob, B. 2011. “The Impact of No Child Left Behind on Student
Achievement.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 30 (3): 418-446
Demo, David and Kenneth Parker. (1987). “Academic Achievement and Self-Esteem
Among Black and White College Students.” The Journal of Social Psychology
Volume 127, Issue 4.
Dilulio, John (1994). Deregulating the Public Service: Can Government Be Improved?
Brookings Institution. Washington, D.C.
Elmore, Richard. (2003). “Accountability and Capacity.” In The new Accountability:
High Schools and High Stakes Testing. Edited by Martin Carnoy, Richard
Elmore, and Leslie Siskin. Rudledge Farmer. New York, NY.
Fayol, Henri (2001). "General Principles of Management." In Classics of Organization
Theory, 5th Edition. Edited by Shafritz and Ott. Harcort Publishing
Finer, Herman (1941). “Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government.”
Public Administration Review, p. 335-352.
Frederickson, George. (1980). New Public Administration. University of Alabama Press.
University, AL
Frederickson, George. (1996). “Comparing the Reinventing Government Movement with
the New Public Administration” Public Administration Review Vol. 56, No. 3
Fryer , Roland and Steven Levitt, (2004). “Black –White Test Score Gap Through Third
Grade.” American Law and Economics Review. Summer 2006 p. 249 – 281.
Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, & Damon. (2001). Good Work When Excellence and Ethics
Meet. Basic Books, New York, NY
Jencks, Christopher and Meredith Phillips, (1998). The Black-White Test Score Gap
edited by Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips. Brookings Institution Press
Gore, A. (1993). “From Red Tape to Results: Creating A Government That Works Better
and Cost Less: Report of the National Performance Review.”
Gulick. (2002). “Notes on the Theory of Organization.” In Classics of Organization
Theory, 5th Edition. Edited by Shafritz and Ott. Harcort Publishing
Hanushek, E., & Raymond, M. (2003). “Lessons about the Design of State
Accountability Systems.” No Child Left Behind? The Politics and Practice of
School Accountability edited by Martin West and Paul Peterson, 126-151.
Washington, DC: Brookings.

88

Haney, Walt. (2000). “The Myth of the Texas Miracle in Education.” Education Policy
Analysis, 8, 31, p. 1-5
Harrison-Jones, L. (2007). “No Child Left Behind and Implications for Black Students.”
The Journal of Negro Education, 75(3), 346-356
Hedges, Larry and Amy Noel, (1998). “Black-White Test Score Convergence since
1965.” In The Black-White Test Score Gap edited by Christopher Jencks and
Meredith Phillips. Brookings Institution Press.
Ho, A. and Ya Ni, A. (2005). “Have Cities Shifted to Outcome-Oriented Performance
Reporting? A Content Analysis of City Budgets.” Public Budgeting and Finance,
25 (2): 61-83
Horner, C. (2001). Beyond Mr. Gradgrind: The Case for Deregulating the Public Sector.
Introduction to Public Administration: A Book of Readings. Edited by J. Steven
Ott and E.W. Russell, Addison Wesley Publishers.
Hochschild, Jennifer. (2003). Rethinking Accountability Politics In No Child Left
Behind? The Politics and Practice of School Accountability. Edited by Paul
Peterson and Martin West. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, p. 107125.
Hurst, David. Alaxandra Tan, Anne Meek, and Jason Sellars. (2003). “Overview and
Inventory of State Education Reforms: 1999 to 2000.” National Center for
Education Statistics, US Department of Education
Ingersoll, Richard. (2001). “Teacher Turnover and Teacher Shortages: An Organizational
Analysis.” American Educational Research Journal Vol. 38. No. 3 p. 499-534
Jacob, Brian. (2003). “A Closer Look at Achievement Gains under High Stakes Testing
in Chicago.” In No Child Left Behind? The Politics and Practice of School
Accountability. Edited by Martin West and Paul Peterson, Brooking Institute
Press, Washington, D.C.
Jeffery, Julie. (1978). Education for Children of the Poor. A Study of the Origins and
Implementation of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. John
Wiley. New York, NY.
Joyce, Phillip. (1993). “Using Performance Measures for Federal Budgeting Proposals
and Prospects.” Public Budgeting and Finance, p. 3–16
Kahlenberg, David. (2010). Helping Children Move from Bad Schools to Good Ones.
Century Foundation. Washington, D.C.

89

Kane, Thomas and Douglas Staiger (2003). “Unintended Consequences of racial
Subgroup Rules.” In No Child Left Behind? The Politics and Practice of School
Accountability. Edited by Martin West and Paul Peterson, Brookings Institute
Press, Washington, D.C.
Kane, Thomas and Douglas Staiger, (2002). “The Promise and Pitfalls of Using
Imprecise School Accountability Measures.” Journal of Economic Prospective,
16, 4, p. 91-114
Katz, Daniel., & Robert Kahn. (1978). The Social Psychology of Organizations. John
Wiley and Sons Inc. Canada
Kanigel, Robert. (2005). The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma
of Efficiency. MIT Press
Kelly, Janet. (2003). ‘Citizen Satisfaction and Administrative Performance Measures: Is
there Really a Link?’ Urban Affairs Review July 2003 vol. 38 no. 6 p. 855-866.
Kettl, D. F. (1990). The Perils-and Prospects of Public Administration. Public
Administration Review.
King, D. S. (1987). The New Right: Politics, Markets, and Citizenship. Dorsey Press.
Belmont, CA.
Kingsley, J. Donald (1944). Representative Bureaucracy: An Interpretation of the British
Civil Service. Antioch Press. Yellow Springs, OH
Kirlin, John. (2001). “Impacts of Institutional Rules on Public Management.” Prepared
for presentation at the 6th National Public Management Research Conference
Bloomington, Indiana
Krippendroff, Klaus. (1969). Content analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology. Sage
Publications. Los Angeles, CA.
Leonard, N., Beauvais, L. & Scholl, R. (2003). “Work Motivation: The Incorporation of
Self-Concept-Based Proceses.” Classic Readings in Organization Behavior, 3rd
Edition. Edited by J. Steven Ott, Sandra Parkes, and Richard Simpson. Wadworth
Publishing, University of Utah.
Light, Paul. (2006). “The Tides of Reform Revisited: Patterns in Making Government
Work, 1945-2002.” Public Administration Review, 66 (1): 6-19.
Lillard and DeCicca. (2001). “Higher Standards, More Dropouts? Evidence Within and
Across Time.” Economics of Education Review Vol. 20 Issue 5
Lorsch, L and Morse, J (1974). Organizations and Their Members: A Contingency
Approach. Harper and Row. New York, NY.
90

Lynn, Carolyn and Laurence Hill. (2005). “Is Hierarchical Governance in Decline?
Evidence from Empirical Research” Journal Public Administration Research
Theory (2005) 15 (2): 173-195.
Massey, Nancy and A. Denton, (1993). American Apartheid Segregation and the Making
of the Underclass. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA.
Mayo, Elton. (1933). The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization. MacMillan
Press. New York, NY.
McConnell, TR. (1971). Accountability and Autonomy. Journal of Higher Education,
Vol. 42, 446-463.
McGregor, D. M. (1960). “The Human Side of Enterprise.” Management Review , 22-28,
88-92
Meier, Kenneth. (2000). Politics and Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of
Government. Harcourt College Publishers, Fort Worth, TX.
Merton, Robert. (1957). “Bureaucracy Structure and Personality.” In Social Theory and
Social Structure. P. 195 – 206
Milkovich, G.T. and Wigdor, A.K., (1991). Pay for performance: evaluating performance
appraisal and merit pay, National Academy Press, Washington D.C.
Moe, T. (2003). “Politics, Control, and the Future of School Accountability.” No Child
Left Behind? The Politics and Practice of School Accountability, edited by Martin
West and Paul Peterson, pp. Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press.
Moe, T. (2011). Special Interest: Teachers Unions and America’s Public Schools. The
Brookings Institution Press. Washington, D.C.
Muller, Chandra and Schiller, Kathryn. (2000). “Leveling the Playing Field? Students’
Educational Attainment and States’ Performance Testing” Sociology of
Education, 73, p. 196 – 218.
National Center for Education Statistics. (2006). “More Schools Are Failing NCLB
Law’s Adequate Yearly Progress’ Requirements: Emerging Trends Under the
Law’s Annual Rating Systems.” www.nea.org/esea/ayptrends0106.html
Nichols, S., Glass, G., & Berliner, D. (2005). “High Stakes Testing and Student
Achievement: Problems for the No Child Left Behind Act.” Arizona State
University, Education Policy Research Unit, Education Policy Studies
Laboratory.

91

Nigro, L., & Nigro, F. (1994). “Traditional Appraisal systems: Scientific Managers and
Civil Service Reformers.” The New Public Personnel Administration. 4th Edition,
Itasca, Ill.: Peacock.
Obama, Barack. (2009). “Race to the Top: The Most Meaningful Reform of Our Public
School in a Generation.” State of the Union Address. January 25, 2011
Orfield, Gary and Chungmei Lee, (2004). Brown At 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s
Nightmare?” The Civil Rights Project, retrieved from
http://performanceassessment.whatkidscando.org/featurestories/previous_years/co
lor_of_learning/pdf/Brownat50HarvardCivilRghts.pdf on October 2, 2013
Orr, A.J. (2000). Racial Differences in Academic Achievement: The Effects of Wealth.
South Bend, IN: Notre Dame Press.
Osborn, Jason. (1999). “Unraveling Underachievement among African American Boys
from an Identification with Academics Perspective.” The Journal of Negro
Education. Vol. 68. No. 4. P. 555-6
Osborn, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial
Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
Inc. Reading, MA
Ott, J.S., Parks, S. J., & Simpson, R.B. (2008). Classics Readings In Organization
Behavior 4th. Thomas Wadsworth. Belmont, CA.
Pan, D., Z.H. Rudo, C.L. Schnieder, and C.L. Smith-Hansen. (2003). “Examination of
Resource Allocation in Education: Connecting Spending to Student
Performance.” Austin, TX. Southwest Educational Development Laboratory.
Patrick, Barbara. (2007). “From Conceptualization to Implementation: The Use of
Performance Measures, Funding and Accountability Systems in the Public
Sector.” Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Mississippi State University,
Mississippi State, MS. Retrieved August 15, 2010.
Patrick, Barbara. (2012). Fiscal Federalism, Performance Policies, and Education
Reforms: Are States Using Performance Policies to Improve Workforce Quality?
Politics and Policy, 40(2): 592-627
Patrick, Barbara. (2013). Ethics and Performance Management Assessing Critical
Elements of No Child Left Behind Performance Reforms. Public Integrity, 221242.
Patrick, B., & French, E. (2011). “Assessing New Public Management’s Focus on
Performance Measurement in the Public Sector: A Look at No Child Left
Behind.” Public Performance and Management Review, 35 (2): 340-369.
92

Peters, B.C. (2002). Administrative Reform and Public Personnel management In Public
Personnel Management Current Concerns, Future Challenges, 3rd Edition. Edited
by Arolyn Ban and Norma Riccucci, New york, NY: Longman Press.
Platt, G., & Parsons, T. (1973). The American University. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Porter, A., Linn, R., & Trimble, C.S. (2005). “The Effects of State Decisions About
NCLB Adequately Yearly Progress Targets.” Educational Measurement: Issues
and Practice, 24 (4): 32-39.
Roethlisberger, F. J. and Dickson, W. J. (1939). Management and the Worker.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rosenholtz. (1987). “Education Reform Strategies: Will They Increase Teacher
Commitment?” American Journal of Education. Vol. 95, No. 4 (Aug., 1987), p.
534-562
Rousseau, Denise, Wade-Benzoni, Kimberly Howard. (1995). “Changing individual–
organization attachments: A two-way street.” The Jossey-Bass social and
behavioral science series. p. 290-322. San Francisco, CA,
Ravitch, Diane (2002). “Education After the Culture Wars.” Deadalus. Vol. 131. No3.
Reyes, Laurie and George Stanic. (1998). “Race, Sex, and Socioeconomic Status and
Mathematics.” Journal of Research in Mathematics Education. Vol. 19, No. 1
Ridley, & Simon. (1943). “Measuring municipal activities: A survey of suggested criteria
for appraising administration.” The International City Managers Association.
Chicago, IL
Rudalevige, A. (2003). “No Child Left Behind: Forging a Congressional Compromise. In
No Child Left Behind?” The Politics and Practice of School Accountability.
Edited by Martin West and Paul Peterson, 23-54. Washington D.C.: Brookings
Rusaw, Carol (2007). “Changing Public Organizations: Four Approaches.” International
Journal of Public Administration. Vol. 30, Issue 3.
Saporito, Salvatore. (2003). “Private Choices and Public Consequences: Magnet School
Choices and Segregation by Race and Poverty.” Social Problems, 50 (2): 181203.
Sherman, W.H. (2008). No Child Left Behind: A Legislative Catalyst for Superintendent
Action to Eliminate Test-Score Gap? Educational Policy 22, no. 5:675-704.
Simon, Herbert. (1982). Models of Bounded Rationality: Empirically Grounded
Economic Reason. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Boston, MA
93

Smith, James. (1999). “The Benefits and Threats of PBB: An Assessment of Modern
Reform.” Public Budgeting and Finance, p. 3 – 15.
South Dakota Department of Education. (2005). NCLB Requirements: Specific Aspects of
South Dakota’s Accountability Plan. South Dakota Department of Education
Report compiled for Legislative Audit. Accessed September 16, 2010 from
http://www.state.sd.us/legislativeaudit/NCLB/Chapter%201%20Specific%20Asp
ects%20of%20SD.pdf.
Steele, Claude (1992). “A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity
and Performance.” American Psychologist, Vol. 52(6), Jun 1997, 613-629
Taylor, Frederick. (1911). The Principles of Scientific Management. New York: Harper
and Row.
Terry, L. (1998). “Administrative Leadership, Neo-Managerialism, and the Public
Management Movement.” Public Administration Review 58, no. 3:194-200.
Udy, Stanley. (1959). “Bureaucracy” and “Rationality” in Weber’s Organization Theory:
An Empirical Study.” American Sociological Review Vol. 24, No. 6 (Dec., 1959),
pp. 791-795
United States Department of Education Data Express State Report. (2010).
http://eddataexpress.gov/state-tabes-report.cfm retrieved on August 3, 2013
Wahba, M. A. and Bridwell, L.G. (1973). “Maslow Reconsidered: A Review of Research
on the Need Hierarchy Theory.” Organizational Behavior and Human
Performance. Vol. 15 Issue 2.
Waldo, Dwight. (1948) The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of
American Public Administration. Ronald Press Co. New York, NY.
Winter, William. (1993) “Hard Truths Tough Choices: An Agenda for State and Local
Reform.” The National Commission on the State and Local Public Service
(Winter Commission) Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government. Albany,
NY
Weber, Max. (1954). “The Essentials of Bureaucratic Organization: An Ideal Type
Construction.” In Contemporary Public Administration. Edited by David
Rosenbloom, Deborah Goldman, and Patricia Ingraham. McGraw-Hill, Inc.
West, Martin and Paul Peterson. (2003). “The Politics and Practice of Accountability.” In
No Child Left Behind? The Politics and Practice of School Accountability. Edited
by Martin West and Paul Peterson. Brookings Institute Press, Washington, D.C.

94

Withworth and Barrienos. (1990). “Comparison of Hispanic and Anglo Graduate Record
Examination Scores and Academic Performance.” Journal of Psychoeducational
Assessment. Vol. 8 No. 2 p. 128 -132
Wong, Kenneth. (2008). Federalism Revised: The Promise and Challenge of the No
Child Left Behind Act. Public Administration Review, Supplement Special Issue
Dec. 2008: S175-85.

95

PERFORMANCE INDEX

96

Pre-Existing
Performance
Measures = 2

0
0
2
0
2
2
0
2
2
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
2
2
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
0
0
0
0

10% rule (Did
not Use) = 1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1

75%
Confidence
Interval (Did
not use) = 1

1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0

Trajectory
Selection

97

0
0
0
2
0
2
2
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
0

Uniform Avg.

0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

Total out of 7

1
0
3
3
2
6
3
2
6
3
1
3
3
2
1
1
3
4
2
3
6
3
6
6
2
3
5
1
3
4
4
5
6
4
3
3
3
0
4
5
0
5
6
5
5
5
3
3
0
1

